Effects of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility on Attributions of Personal Responsibility for Institutionalization by Oksner, Phyllis White
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1977 
Effects of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility on 
Attributions of Personal Responsibility for Institutionalization 
Phyllis White Oksner 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Psychiatric and Mental Health Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Oksner, Phyllis White, "Effects of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility on Attributions of Personal 
Responsibility for Institutionalization" (1977). Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 
1539625000. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-6nbz-3c48 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
EFFECTS OF PERSONAL SIMILARITY AND SITUATIONAL POSSIBILITY ON 
ATTRIBUTIONS OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
INSTITUTIONAL! ZATI ON
. A Thesis 
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of Psychology 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
Phyllis Oksner
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts
~Jj Phyllis W. Oksner
Approved, May 1977
Kelly GJ Shaver
Robert A. Johns
Glen Shean
/
1 aJ^ —  ( ^ / V <
■ (y*?
R. Wayne Kernbdle
E. Rae Harcum, Chairman 
Department of Psychology
6 6 0 0 9 2
To my parents, who have always encouraged me to 
"hitch my wagon to a star".
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.................    v
LIST OF TABLES. . . .......................   vi
LIST OF FIGURES................................................vii
ABSTRACT. .  ...............     viii
INTRODUCTION   . ......................... 2
METHOD............... .... . . 18
RESULTS     . . .  .........................  . 30
DISCUSSION..........................   43
APPENDICES....................................   50
A. Bogus Subject Feedback  .........  51
B. Participant’s Consent Form.............     53
C. ‘ Stimulus Person Profile . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 55
D. Estimates of Personal Similarity and Situational.Possi­
bility  ................ .    58
E. Written Instructions to Subjects  .......  60
F. Attribution Measures . . . . . . .  62
G. Social Distance Measures  .........  67
H. Attitudes Toward Mentally 111 Persons . . . . . . . . .  70
I. Biographical Information .  .......  73
J. Debriefing Outline. , . .  ........... . . . .  . . . .  75
K. Disclosure Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . .   .......  77
REFERENCES...........      . 79
iv
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is greatly indebted to Dr, Kelly G. Shaver for his 
theoretical contributions to the current study, as well as his 
valuable assistance in the methodological design and interpretation 
of results. In addition, thanks are due to Dr, Robert A. Johnston 
for his critique of early drafts of the paper. This study was sup­
ported by a grant awarded in November 197 6 by the Faculty Research 
Committee of the College of William and Mary.
v
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1 Mean Similarity and Possibility Judgments Made by COM
Subjects ........ . . . . . . . .    31
2 Mean Estimates of Perceived Personal Similarity and
Situational Possibility by Condition... ..... 33
3 Mean Scores for Attributed Responsibility by Condi­
tions. •  ................................. 35
k Mean Social Distance Scores by Condition............  37
5 Mean Scores on Attitudes Toward Mentally 111 Persons
Scale by Conditions........................  39
6 Intercorrelations of Attribution of Personal Responsi­
bility and Willingness to Interact by Condi­
tion .........    1|1
vi
LIST OF F/IGURE
Predicted Attribution of Responsibility and Social Distance 
(Willingness to Interact) by Condition. . . .............
ABSTRACT
In our everyday world we are constantly faced with the poten­
tially difficult task of deciding who or what was responsible for a 
particular effect— trying to discern what personal factors as well 
as situational factors contributed to the observed outcome. The 
current research explored possible distortions of the attributed 
personal responsibility for institutionalization in a mental hospi­
tal as a function of perceived personal similarity to the stimulus 
person as well as likelihood of being in a similar situation (situ­
ational possibility). Female college students read about a stimulus 
person who was described as either personally similar or personally 
different from the subject. Descriptions of the stimulus person 
varied so as to describe either a high situational possibility 
situation or a low situational possibility situation. Attributed 
responsibility delineated along Heider's levels of responsibility 
indicated support for Lerner's "just world" hypothesis at the level 
of Foreseeability and Shaver’s "defensive attribution" paradigm at 
the level of Intention. Social distance measures revealed greater 
willingness to interact with a similar disturbed stimulus person as 
compared to a dissimilar disturbed stimulus person. Implications 
stemming from current findings for methods of increasing community 
acceptance of deinstitutionalized clinical populations are discussed.
EFFECTS OF PERSONAL SIMILARITY AND SITUATIONAL POSSIBILITY ON 
ATTRIBUTIONS OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION
INTRODUCTION
As described "by Shaver (1975) attribution processes are those 
cognitive events that enable perceivers to interpret the actions of 
other people. In recent years three major theories have been espoused 
to explain the interaction of personal and environmental forces in the 
production of observed events (Heider, 1958; Jones & Davis, 19&5; Kel­
ley, 1967> 1971> 1973)* Heider's "naive psychology" emphasizes the 
motivational and ability (personal forces) which must have been present 
in the actor in order for him to overcome the difficulty of a task 
(environmental force) that is observed to have been accomplished by the 
actor. Jones and Davis have added to Heider's original analysis con­
sideration by the perceiver of what the actor might have done. Obser­
vers take into account the unique effects of potential actions in order 
to understand the actor's reasons for choosing one alternative of 
action as opposed to another. Kelley's attributional theory empha­
sizes the principle of covariation: a perceiver establishes the
potency of a presumed cause by observing the occurrence of the effect 
in the presence of the cause and the nonoccurrence of the effect in 
the absence of the cause.
In recent years empirical investigations have drawn from these 
attribution theories to explain many kinds of subject responses, in­
cluding attribution of ability (Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals, & Ward, 
1968), responsibility (Shaw & Sulzer, 19&U; Walster, 1966), emotional
2
3state (Nisbett & Valins, 1971)> insomnia (Storms & Nisbett, 1970) and 
motivation (Weiner, 197U)« Of primary interest to the current research 
are the numerous experimental and theoretical papers which have dealt 
with attribution of causality for events, particularly for unfortunate 
events such as accidents (e.g., see reviews by Fishbein & Ajzen, 1973; 
Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, Valins, & Weiner, 1972; Shaver, 1975; 
Vidmar & Crinklaw, 197U). The three models of the attribution process 
mentioned above, as well as several reviews of the research literature 
(Brewer, 1977; Miller & Ross, 1976), have suggested that a perceiver 
undergoes a rational analysis of personal and environmental factors con­
tributing to an event in order to interpret and understand those events.
Although rational attribution may be the general rule, there do 
seem to be some important exceptions. For example, drawing on earlier 
research by Walster (1966), Shaver (1970a, 1970b, 1973> 1975) sug­
gested that two variables— personal similarity and situational possi­
bility— may combine to produce distortions in attribution. Shaver 
labels this motivated distortion of responsibility and blame defensive 
attribution, and theorizes that both personal similarity and situa­
tional possibility must be present in order for the full effects of 
attributional distortion to occur, proposing an interaction between the 
two factors. In instances of high situational possibility, high per­
ceived personal similarity will result in exaggeration of responsibil­
ity to chance, while low perceived personal similarity will result in 
exaggeration of responsibility to the person. Under conditions of low 
situational possibility no significant judgmental distortions will 
occur. Situational possibility is typically operationally defined as 
the likelihood that one might find him/herself in the same situation
4as the stimulus person.
Support for the idea of motivated distortion of attribution can 
be found in a study by McKillip (1972, reported in McKillip & Posavac, 
1972) who reported that increased personal similarity between observer 
and "victim" of an automobile accident led to attribution of less per­
sonal responsibility for the accident than for dissimilar victims. 
McKillip and Posavac (1972) extended this investigation to include 
effects of severity of outcome and found that the similar victim was 
seen as less responsible for a serious accident than is a dissimilar 
victim. This effect was reversed, however, for attribution of respon­
sibility of a mild accident. One may infer from this difference that 
subjects were not threatened by similarity to a victim of a mild acci­
dent and therefore did not distort attribution of responsibility.
In a very clever demonstration of defensive attribution, Younger, 
Arrowood and Harris (1977) illustrated the influence of personal simi­
larity and situational possibility on the assignment of the effects of 
a "mild sexual transgression" on a romantic relationship. Subjects 
who were also romantically involved (personally similar) as well as the 
same sex of the transgressor (situationally possible) were less willing 
than opposite sex subjects (situationally impossible) to regard a mild 
sexual transgression as detrimental to an observed romantic relation­
ship. The authors interpreted this effect as a defensive avoidance of 
assignment of severity of outcome when subjects were reading about a 
stimulus person with whom they might closely identify (personally simi­
lar as well as situationally possible). Subjects acted to avoid any 
possibility of future blameworthiness should they at some future time 
be in the same situation as the stimulus person, by reducing the negative
5consequences (potential for "blame) attributed to the transgression.
Schroeder and Linder (1976) have argued that in order for a
threat to self-image to occur, and thereby result in a distortion of
attribution, the actor rather than situational factors must be seen as
primary cause agents. These authors argue that:
• . • Defensive attributions of responsibility may, 
then, be conceptualized as a two-step process. The 
observer must first perceive the actor as a primary 
causal agent of events for which the observer would 
not want to be blamed. Then, motivated by a need to 
avoid personal feelings of blameworthiness or vulner­
ability, the observer assigns a minimized degree of 
responsibility to the actor. Somewhat paradoxically, 
therefore, exactly those circumstances that heighten 
perceptions of the actor’s causal role in an accident 
will lead to defensively lenient assignments of 
responsibility
It would appear, however, that in fact this potential to perceive the 
actor as the causal agent is already implicit in the defensive attribu­
tion literature reviewed above. The essence of defensive attribution 
is that within the context of an ambiguous combination of personal and 
situational causal factors and when threatened by potential blame­
worthiness or vulnerability, the subject maximizes responsibility to 
chance or situational factors.
An alternate theoretical explanation for motivated distortion 
of attribution has been proposed by Lemer and his colleagues (Lemer, 
1965; Lemer & Becker, 1962; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lemer & Matthews, 
1967; Novak & Lemer, 1968). This explanation holds that subjects have 
a need to believe in a ’’just world”. In order to protect this belief, 
subjects will iassign negative characteristics to a victim of negative 
consequences; put simply, the subject will devalue the victim in order 
to justify that "he got what he deserved”. This tendency to derogate
6an innocent victim presents problems for a subject who perceives him­
self similar to the observed victim. Empirical evidence has shown 
(Novak & Lemer, 1968; Lemer & Agar, 1972) that the observer will pre­
fer to avoid contact with an innocent victim perceived as similar but 
will not devalue him. Lemer and Matthews (1967) have proposed that in 
such a situation the important dimension becomes perception of a common 
fate, not perceived similarity. In an experimental test of Lemer's 
premise of a 11 just world" leading to devaluation of the victim, how­
ever, Sorrentino and Boutilier (197b) found evidence more in support 
of a defensive attribution interpretation. After seeing a peer (vic­
tim) receive painful electric shock as punishment for errors in a 
serial learning -task, subjects who saw the situation as highly possible 
to occur to them were significantly less likely to devalue the victim 
than subjects who did not anticipate being in a similar situation.
Chaiken and Barley (1973) have provided an additional empiri­
cal comparison between the models proposed by "defensive attribution" 
and "just world" for explaining motivated distortion of attribution.
In an investigation of the effects of situational possibility and 
severity of outcome, Chaiken and Darley (1973) found that those sub­
jects in a worker-supervisor cooperation task who were to be future 
supervisors attributed more responsibility to chance for a videotaped 
accident caused by another supervisor (high situational possibility) 
than did subjects who were to be workers (future worker— low situa­
tional possibility). This finding is in clear accord with a defensive
attribution prediction of reduction of personal responsibility (and
*
thereby greater attribution to chance or environmental factors) attri­
buted to a stimulus person when the perceiver is aware that he may be
in the same position as the stimulus person in the future. The authors
however, cite the future worker-severe consequences condition as provid
ing the critical comparison between the appropriateness of "just world"
or "defensive attribution" for explaining their results which clearly
indicate motivated distortion of attribution:
The just-world hypothesis predicts that the victim 
of the severe accident, the worker, is devalued in 
order to maintain a belief in justice. But the 
defensive attribution hypothesis suggests that peo­
ple who perceive themselves as potential victims of 
similar accidents should not devalue the observed 
victim; to do so would be threatening to themselves.
And this is what the data showed; only future super­
visors reported disliking of the worker who was the 
victim of the severe accident; future workers did 
not. The tendency in the severe conditions for 
future workers to blame the supervisor does not re­
store justice. After all, the taped worker is 
still victimized by loss of earnings .even if a culp­
able agent is identified. When the need for justice 
and defensive attribution work together, the joint 
effect is strongly present; when they conflict, 
justice, in the form of disliking the innocent vic­
tim, is not sought if this justice is threatening 
to the observer /p, 27^7 *
Reluctance to assign blame for an accident to a person in a situation
similar to that which the subject expected to be in was particularly
strong when the consequences were severe.
Criticisms of the defensive attribution research have focused 
on the ambiguities inherent in the research designs which have made 
interpretation of the research impossible in terms of any consistent 
theoretical terms (Pishbein & Ajzen, 1973) as well as the inadequacy of 
empirical support for various defensive attribution hypotheses (Vidmar 
& Crinklaw, 197U)* Fishbein and Ajzen suggest that one of the primary 
reasons why researchers in attribution have obtained ambiguous results
is because they have failed to define levels of responsibility in the
8questions asked of subjects. The authors propose that much of the ambi­
guity in research results might be cleared up if researchers delineate 
the questions asked of subjects according to the five levels of respon­
sibility defined by Heider (1958): (l) Association,* the actor is held
responsible for all effects that are in any way associated with him;
(2) Commission, the actor is seen as instrumental in producing (contri­
buting to) the observed effects; (3) Foreseeability, the actor is held 
responsible for those effects he could have foreseen; (I4.) Intentional- 
ity, the actor is held responsible for those effects he intended; and 
(5) Justification, the actor is held responsible only for those effects 
which were not justified. Vidmar and Crinklaw also cite delineation of 
levels of responsibility in the dependent variables used in attribution 
research as a means of refining the method of studying attribution pro­
cesses.
A very recent argument against the motivated distortion attri- 
butional paradigm has been proposed by Brewer (1977)• Her position 
cites attribution of responsibility (AB) as being the result of simple 
information processing which takes into account congruence ( c ) ,  "the 
subjective probability that the outcome would be expected to occur given 
the action perpetrated by A11 ^p. 577 * as well as prior expectancy (PE), 
"the subjective probability that the outcome would have occurred given 
prior conditions . . .  in the absence of the perpetrator’s interven­
tion" $27. Brewer agrees that such factors as role similarity and 
severity of consequence may affect the congruence aspect of the simple 
additive equation proposed by her model (AB = C - PE), but she postu­
lates that the resulting bias in information processing arises from a
*Labels were introduced by Shaw and Sulzer (1964).
need to reduce complexity of decision-making rather than from any self- 
protective motivational forces.
Taking into account these recent criticisms of past research in 
defensive attribution, the current research measured attribution of 
personal responsibility for institutionalization in a mental hospital. 
In response to Pishbein and Ajzen, dependent measures of responsibility 
were differentiated along Heider’s five levels. Also, in response to 
Brewer’s arguments, measures of prior expectancy as well as similarity 
(personal similarity and situational possibility) were made at two 
points in time during the experimental task. This procedure provided 
a comparison of subjects' perceived similarity before finding out that 
the stimulus person is institutionalized with subjects' perceived simi­
larity at the end of the experimental task (measured between subjects—  
all subjects made only one estimate of similarity). Prior expectancy 
of institutionalization was also measured at both times. This proce­
dure provided empirical measurement of the extent of engagement in 
self-protective defense measures such as denial of personal and situa­
tional similarity as a function of knowledge of the institutionaliza­
tion of the stimulus person. It is the major proposition of this re­
search that attributional processes, particularly those involved in 
defensive attribution, can be used to explain some of the results of 
Farina and his associates (particularly Ring & Farina, 1969) their 
studies of interpersonal reactions to persons with histories of insti­
tutionalization.
An extensive line of research conducted by Farina and his asso­
ciates (Farina & Ring, 1965; Farina, Holland & Ring, 1966; Farina, 
Allen, & Saul, 1968; Ring & Farina, 1969; Farina & Gliha, 1971; Farina,
10
Felner & Boudreau, 1973; Farina & Felner, 1973; Farina & Hagelauer, 
197U; Farina, Thaw, Lovern & Mangone, 197U;* Farina, 1975; Farina & 
Hagelauer, 1975) has dealt with the interpersonal consequences of hav­
ing Been institutionalized in a mental institution or even being per­
ceived as having been institutionalized. In much the same way as 
Rosenhan (1973) found the once-given label of schizophrenia to have 
long-term effects on the attribution of behaviors to the illness,
Farina and his associates have found that those persons with history 
of mental illness often experience negative experiences in their inter­
actions with normals. Other researchers have typically obtained find­
ings consistent with those of Farina with regard to the negative con­
sequences of being perceived as having been institutionalized for men­
tal illness ("Whatley, 1959; Phillips, 1962, 1961;; Novak & Lerner, 1968; 
Siassi, Spiro & Crocetti, 1973; Zimmerman, 1971+; 1*03? a review see Rab- 
kin, 1971+). This negative response seems to be inversely correlated 
with educational level and positively correlated with age (Crocetti, 
Spiro & Siassi, 1971)•
The conceptual framework for the current study was derived 
from a study by Ring and Farina (1969) in which Rorschach results given 
to subjects were manipulated so as to provide the subject with informa­
tion that he was either psychologically similar to or dissimilar to a 
confederate thought to be an "ex-mental patient." One third of the 
subjects were told that their emotional stability as_measured in terms 
of the norms for college students was in the bottom 5 percent (Emotion­
ally Unstable condition). Another third of the subjects were given 
feedback which placed them in the top 5 percent in terms of emotional 
stability (Enotionally Stable condition). The remaining third of the
11
subjects "fell somewhere between the two extremes . . . in an attempt 
to induce uncertainty concerning how emotionally unstable they really 
were” 5- seg. The purpose of this study was to investigate the rela­
tionship between perceived similarity and treatment of an ex-mental 
patient, so all subjects were asked to administer shocks to the ex- 
patient, ostensibly for incorrect responses in a learning task.
Those subjects who perceived themselves personally similar 
(i.e., emotionally unstable) to the confederate administered shorter 
duration of shock than did those subjects who perceived themselves as 
personally dissimilar (i.e., emotionally stable). Conversely, Milgram 
(1965) found a ’’negatively monotonic’’ relationship to exist between 
treatment of a ’’student" and perceived similarity. Wright (i960) and 
Yablonsky (1966), however, in studies of stigma assigned as a result 
of physical disability and race, had discerned a more curvilinear func­
tion existing between similarity and negative treatment.
Several other studies have investigated the consequences of a 
subject's perception of similarity to a stimulus person believed to 
have a history of mental illness (Novak & Lemer, 1968; Bennett, 1972; 
Zimmerman, 197W • a study on "impression formation" subjects showed 
greater willingness to interact with a disturbed dissimilar partner 
than a similar one. Sorrentino and Boutilier (197U) have explained 
these seemingly incongruous results (in terms of expected favorable 
reaction to a similar other) by postulating that responsibility for a 
negative outcome of the interaction would be less difficult to attri­
bute to a dissimilar "victim" than a similar "victim". Bennett's (1972) 
results confirmed a prediction of attribution of more behavioral mani­
festations of moderate mental illness to dissimilar "ex-mental patients"
12
than to similar ’’patients". Zimmerman (l97U)» however, obtained results 
that differed from many of these findings. In this study subjects re­
ceived bogus psychological feedback which assigned them to ’’disturbed” 
or ’’adjusted" groups (and thereby personally dissimilar or similar). 
Subjects were found to prefer subsequent interaction with similar others 
rather than dissimilar— even when the similar other was known to have a 
history of hospitalization.
Assuming that perceivers find it threatening to discover simi­
larities to mental patients, these results concerning institutional 
stigma seem very much like the process of defensive attribution of 
responsibility as outlined by Shaver (1970a, 1970b, 1973> 1975)• With­
in the framework of defensive attribution, perceivers are expected to 
"make whatever attributions will best reduce the threat posed by the 
situation . . .  a perceiver's own self-protective motivation can some­
times distort his attributions of responsibility" /shaver, 1975> P» 1107.
It would seem,then, that a loose interpretation of this model 
for assignment of responsibility may explain the:results obtained by 
Ring and Farina (1969) in the study discussed above. In both the 
stigma study by Ring and Farina and in Shaver's model of defensive 
attribution perceived personal similarity to an actor led to more bene­
volent treatment of that actor (operationally defined as reduced dura­
tion of shock in the stigma experiment and reduction of personal 
responsibility in the attribution model). A problem with this compari­
son is the absence of manipulation of situational possibility in the 
Ring and Farina study, which has been suggested by Shaver (1973) to be 
necessary for defensive attribution to occur. Also, Zimmerman manipu­
lated personal similarity without regard to situational possibility.
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On the other hand, Bennett (1972) manipulated situational possibility 
but failed to deal with personal similarity.
To provide a precise test of the relationship between the 
assignment of stigma as a result of institutionalization and defensive 
attribution, this research explored possible distortions of the per­
sonal responsibility attributed for commitment to a mental hospital as 
a function of both perceived situational possibility and personal simi­
larity to the stimulus person. The relationship between the attribu­
tion of personal responsibility and the assignment of stigma as mea­
sured by social distance within each condition was investigated.
Also, as mentioned above, in response to criticisms by Brewer 
(1977) that differences in attributed responsibility resulting from 
factors such as situational possibility and personal similarity are the 
result of attempts to reduce information processing complexity rather 
than motivated distortion, estimates of the Prior Expectancy of the 
negative consequence in the current design (institutionalization for 
mental illness) as well as estimates of personal and situational simi­
larity were acquired from subjects prior to finding out that the nega­
tive consequence occurred, as well as after. The resultant three fac­
tor between-subjects design (Personal Similarity by Situational Possi­
bility by Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Pos­
sibility) provided an empirical test for the following hypotheses:
l) In accord with the model of defensive attribution:
a. Personally Similar-High Situational Possibility subjects 
will reduce threat of future personal responsibility 
(and therefore more responsibility to chance or environ­
mental factors) by assigning less personal responsibility
14
to the stimulus person as compared with subjects in the 
other three variations of Personal Similarity and Situa­
tional Possibility (see Figure l). 
b. Personally Dissimilar-High Situational Possibility sub­
jects will exaggerate the amount of personal responsi­
bility assigned to the stimulus person for her institu­
tionalization (see Figure l).
2) With regard to social distance:
a. Personally Similar subjects will demonstrate greater 
willingness to interact with the stimulus person than 
will Personally Dissimilar subjects. An interaction 
between Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility 
is expected such that willingness to interact is great­
est under conditions of High Personal Similarity as well 
as High Situational Possibility (see Figure l).
b. Willingness to interact with a person who has been hos­
pitalized for mental illness will be negatively corre­
lated with attribution of personal responsibility for 
that institutionalization.
3) In opposition to Brewer's (1977) view of subjects as rational 
information processors who are not motivated to distort in­
formation given them, it is predicted that:
a. Subjects who "commit" themselves to a level of Personal 
Similarity and Situational Possibility prior to learning 
that the stimulus person becomes institutionalized will 
rate themselves as more Personally Similar and will give 
higher estimates of Situational Possibility than will
15
Figure 1
Predicted Attribution of Responsibility and 
Social Distance (Willingness to Interact) by Condition
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subjects who remain "Not Committed" until the end of the 
experimental task.
"Committed" subjects will be more likely to engage in 
defensive attribution than will "Not Committed" subjects.
METHOD
Subjects
Eighty-four sophomore and junior undergraduate females at the 
College of William and Mary were selected at random from the student 
directory for participation in the current research. Subjects were 
contacted by phone and asked to participate in a study on "impression 
formation". All subjects were concentrating in a subject area other 
than psychology. Incentive for participation was provided by offering 
all subjects a ten percent chance of earning $10.00 (through a raffle). 
Twenty-two additional subjects were recruited but did not report to the 
assigned room for participation. Data from four subjects were excluded 
from the analysis because these subjects reported that a member of 
their immediate family had been hospitalized for mental illness. There 
was an even distribution of subjects among the eight experimental con­
ditions (n per cell = 10).
Independent Variables
Independent variables included Personal Similarity, manipulated 
by bogus psychological feedback given to subjects prior to the experi­
mental task; Situational Possibility, the likelihood that the subject 
would experience a situation similar to that of the stimulus person; 
and Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility, 
either prior to finding out that the stimulus person has been institu­
tionalized, or after receiving that information.
18
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Personal Similarity. The manipulation of personal similarity 
was achieved by delivering bogus feedback to subjects following admin­
istration of the Rotter Internal-External Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). 
Feedback was given to subjects in the form of a bar graph with ten 
scales ostensibly based on the I-E questions shown as percentiles and 
identified only by number (see Appendix A). In the Personally Similar 
(SIM) condition the subject's percentile scores varied no more than 5 
percentile points on each scale from the score of the stimulus person. 
The direction of the variability of scores from those of the stimulus 
person was randomized across scales. In the Personally Dissimilar (DIS) 
condition each scale score differed by a minimum of i|0 percentile 
points (with direction and variability again randomized). This manipu­
lation of personal similarity was included to test the hypothesis that 
as with the assignment of stigma, attribution of personal causality to 
mental patients will be significantly less under those conditions in 
which perceived personal similarity is high (i.e., if subjects are 
given bogus information as to their similarity to the stimulus person). 
In their study using a measure of the duration of shock administered 
in a learning task as the operational definition of differential treat­
ment, Ring and Farina (1969) found this relationship between perceived 
psychological similarity and duration of shock to be "negatively mono­
tonic".
Situational Possibility. Situational possibility, operational­
ized as the likelihood that the observer might find herself in a situa­
tion like that of the stimulus person, was manipulated by a variation 
in the description of the life circumstances of the stimulus person.
The stimulus person was described as either a senior college student
20
at a "small, prestigious, liberal arts school", a situation very much
o<
like that of the subject (Situational Possibility— HIGH P0S)Aas a "young 
mother with two children", a situation unlike that of the subject 
(Situational Possibility— LOW POS).
Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possi­
bility. In order to test the validity of Brewer's (1977) interpreta­
tion of the findings in the defensive attribution literature as being 
a result of rational information processing rather than due to self- 
protective motivational forces, an additional variable of Time of Esti­
mate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility was added to 
the typical defensive attribution model which only manipulates Personal 
Similarity and Situational Possibility. Half of the subjects made 
estimates of personal and situational similarity and likelihood of 
being in the same situation (situational possibility) prior to finding 
out that the stimulus person has been institutionalized (but after re­
ceiving information concerning Personal Similarity and Situational 
Possibility). These estimates of Personal Similarity and Situational 
Possibility served as checks on the manipulation of these variables. 
Also, having made these estimates these subjects were Committed (COM) 
to the level of similarity they had indicated. The remaining subjects 
did not make these similarity estimates until the end of the experimen­
tal task, and were, therefore, more free to deny the levels of Personal 
Similarity and Situational Possibility which had been experimentally 
assigned to them when answering the questions involving attribution and 
social distance. These subjects remained Uncommitted (NOT COM) to the 
experimental manipulations.
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Procedure
Subjects reported to the social psychology laboratory at the 
College of William and Mary in small groups of no more than five per 
group. Three rooms within the lab were available for use so that no 
more than two subjects actually shared a room while completing the ex­
perimental task. All experimental sessions and debriefings were con­
ducted by a female experimenter. Upon arriving at the experimental 
setting each subject signed a Participant’s Consent Form which included 
the statement that the subject could terminate her participation at any 
point during the study (see Appendix B). Also included on this form 
was the subject’s ’’raffle ticket”. The subject completed the ticket 
and placed it in the raffle box prior to beginning any experimental 
tasks. This procedure was intended to assure the subject that her 
chance of winning one of the raffle prizes was entirely independent of 
her responses on the experimental task, or even her completion of the 
experimental task.
After completing the consent form and raffle ticket, the sub­
ject was given a copy of the Rotter Internal-External Control Scale 
(Rotter, 1966). Verbal instructions to the subject at this point were 
as follows:
As I told you when I talked to you on the phone, I am 
interested in studying impression formation. Past re­
search in this area has indicated that individual differ­
ences and similarities between the perceiver, which is 
you, and the stimulus person, which is the person about 
whom you will be reading, may affect reactions to the 
stimulus person. Therefore, for the purpose of this re­
search I have gathered some information about the stimu­
lus person about whom you will be reading on certain 
personality variables, and at this time I need to gather 
the same sort of information about you. I assure you 
that none of this information is particularly personal
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or threatening; it will merely allow me to give you some 
feedback as to how similar or different you are to the 
stimulus person you will be reading about.
When the subject had finished the Rotter Scale, the experimen­
ter re-entered the experimental room. Verbal instructions given at 
this point dismissed the subject for ten minutes so that the experi­
menter could "score the subject's test". In reality, the feedback to 
be given the subject had been prepared in advance.
Random assignment of subjects to conditions was achieved by 
placing the experimental materials for all subjects into separate 
manila folders prior to the experimental session. The Personality Pro­
file sheet was positioned in the folder so that it extended one and 
one-half inches -from the top of the folder. This allowed the experi­
menter to assign subjects at random (by writing the subject's name on 
a Personality Profile) to experimental conditions (as determined by the 
stimulus materials) while remaining completely blind to the actual 
condition to which the subject had been assigned.
Manipulation of Personal Similarity. After the break, the 
experimenter delivered to the subject (in a manila folder) the "results" 
of her personality test, as well as the results "on the same test" of 
the stimulus person about whom she would be reading (see Appendix C). 
Written instructions to the subjects included the statement that the 
subject would be able to keep her own personality profile. This in­
struction was included to insure subjects that the experimenter would 
not be keeping any material with the subject's name attached. The 
complete written instructions written on the front of the manila folder 
read as follows:
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This folder contains the results of your questions as 
well as the results from the same questionnaire of the 
person about whom you will be reading. Please examine 
your results carefully and COMPARE THEM WITH THE PERSON 
ABOUT WHOM YOU WILL BE READING. After you have compared 
the results, answer the question sheets provided. When 
you have completed all materials, return the sheets to 
the folder, except your personality profile. You may 
keep your profile.
The "test feedback" provided to subjects varied as described 
above to provide a profile either very similar to or very different 
from that of the stimulus person. The similarity (or difference) indi­
cated by the scores was emphasized by a handwritten statement on the 
bottom of the subject's profile which read as follows:
Your results show that you are very similar (differ­
ent) in personality to Sarah Jackson.
Manipulation of Situational Possibility. Experimental manipu­
lation of Situational Possibility was achieved via the written descrip­
tion of the stimulus person about whom the subject would be reading.
The written description for the High Situational Possibility (HIGH POS)
condition read as follows:
You will be answering questions about Sarah Jackson 
based on limited information about her. Sarah is a 
student at a small, prestigious liberal arts college.
The pressures of her classes are very similar to yours.
She is a senior and is maintaining a "B" average.
Based on the information you have just read, please 
answer the following questions about Sarah Jackson.
In the Low Situational Possibility (LOW POS) condition Sarah was de­
scribed as a "young housewife with two children":
You will be answering questions about Sarah Jackson 
based on limited information about her. Sarah is a 
young mother (twenty-one) with two children. The pres­
sures of her situation are very different from yours.
Based on the information you have just read, please 
answer the following questions about Sarah Jackson.
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Timing of Similarity Judgments. At this point, prior to any 
mention of Sarah Jackson's hospitalization for mental illness, half of 
the subjects in each condition answered several questions regarding 
their estimated personal similarity and possibility of being in circum­
stances like those of Sarah Jackson. Perceived similarity and possi­
bility were measured by the following questions:
1. How similar in personality do you consider yourself to be 
to Sarah Jackson?
2. How similar are the pressures which Sarah Jackson experi­
ences to the pressures which you experience?
3. What do you think are the chances out of 10 that you 
might find yourself in the same situation as Sarah Jack­
son?
Responses to the first two questions were made by checking one of seven 
answer choices ranging from "Very Similar" to "Very Dissimilar". 
Response to the third question was made by circling a number between 
one and ten (see Appendix D).
Similarity and possibility estimates provided at this point 
(n = 1+0) provided a check on the manipulations of Personal Similarity 
and Situational Possibility. Those subjects not "committing" them­
selves to a level of similarity at this point (n = 1+0) received a 
"Prior Expectancy" question:
Estimate the probability that someone similar to Sarah
Jackson in situation and personality would need to be
hospitalized in a mental hospital.
_____ percent
The next written instruction (see Appendix E) to subjects directed them 
to insert Form A (which included the similarity questions for half the 
subjects and the Prior Expectancy question for the other half) into an 
envelope included in the packet and to seal the envelope. This
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procedure prevented the subject from changing the information included 
on Form A after reading that Sarah Jackson was hospitalized for mental 
illness.
The next instructions to the subject described the procedure 
for answering the Likert-type attribution questions as well as for 
assigning the ’’responsibility" and "blame tokens" (see Appendix E).
The next page of the experimental booklet for subjects in the High 
Situational Possibility (HIGH POS) condition contained the following 
additional information about Sarah Jackson:
Sarah Jackson had recently been under a great deal of 
pressure at school. The pressures of being a senior at 
a small prestigious school had- become more than she 
could handle. One week-end, during exams, she became 
so depressed that she cried continuously and hysterically 
for seemingly no reason at all. Her roommate suggested 
that she should seek help at the university counseling 
center. The psychologist at the counseling center sug­
gested that she should go to Westside -Mental Hospital 
for a few weeks to pull herself together. Sarah has 
been at Westside for two weeks and is doing much better.
The Low Situational Possibility (LOW POS) condition described Sarah as:
. . . under a great deal of pressure at home. The
pressures of being a young mother with two small chil­
dren had become more than she could handle. One week­
end she became so depressed that she cried continuously 
and hysterically for seemingly no reason at all. Her 
husband suggested that she should seek help at the local 
Crisis Intervention Center. The psychologist at the 
center suggested that she should go to Westside Mental 
Hospital.
Attribution Measures. Measurement of the subject’s attributions 
of responsibility for Sarah. Jackson's hospitalization was achieved 
through the subject's responses to several 7-point Likert-type scales
(see Appendix F). These questions were delineated along Heider's
levels of responsibility as follows:
Commission: Do you think Sarah contributed in any way to
her hospitalization?
26
Foreseeability: Do you think Sarah could have foreseen
the fact that she would he hospitalized?
Intention: Do you think Sarah intended to become
hospitalized?
The subject was also asked to divide one hundred "responsibil­
ity tokens" and one hundred "blame" tokens among four factors: Sarah
Jackson, the environment (especially her school/family), chance, or to 
other causes. The division of "responsibility"tokens task instructed 
the subject as follows:
Please divide the following responsibility tokens among 
the following factors which may have been responsible 
for Sarah's hospitalization: Sarah (S), the environment
( e ) ,  chance ( c ) ,  or other causes ( o ) .  Draw a circle 
around the number of tokens you wish to assign to each 
factor and label each circle with the abbreviation for 
the factor (S, E, C, 0).
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R  
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R  
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R  
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R  
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R  
As a final attributional measure subjects were asked to write 
a paragraph of advice to Sarah Jackson on how to avoid being hospital­
ized (in a mental hospital) in the future. Responses on this item were 
analyzed in terms of whether or not a paragraph was written as well as 
the number of words written. Also, responses were rated by two raters 
(one male, one female) to determine the number of suggestions to Sarah 
for personal changes which might prevent future institutionalization 
as well as environmental changes which would produce the same effect.
Social Distance Measures. Willingness to interact with the 
stimulus person was measured by several social distance questions (taken
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from Oksner & Shaver, 1977)* Willingness to interact was measured at
several levels of intimacy:
How Willing would you he to have a class with Sarah 
Jackson?
How willing would you he to work with Sarah Jackson?
How willing would you he to have Sarah Jackson as a
member in a club that you were a member of?
How willing would you he to share a room with Sarah
Jackson?
How willing would you he to have Sarah Jackson as a 
best friend?
Subjects responded to these questions on five -point scales ranging 
from "Definitely Willing" to "Definitely Not Willing" (see Appendix G).
Attitudes Toward Mentally 111 Persons. The Attitudes Toward 
Mentally 111 Persons scale (Davis, 1972) includes sixteen adjectives 
presented in a semantic differential format (see Appendix H). Sample 
adjective pairs include:
Good :__ :__:___ :___ :___:__:___ : Bad
Kind :__ :__:___ :___ :___:__:___ : Cruel
Passive :__ :__:___ :__ j ___:__:___ : Active
Subjects responded to these adjectives by placing an "X" on the line 
which corresponded with their attitude toward mentally ill persons on 
each adjective pair.
Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility for 
"Not Committed" Subjects. After answering all experimental questions, 
those subjects (n = i|0) who did not answer questions concerning their 
Personal Similarity to the stimulus person as well as the likelihood 
that they would experience similar situations (Situational Possibility) 
prior to answering the experimental questions, answered those questions
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after completing the Attitudes Toward Mentally 111 Persons question­
naire. Comparison of similarity estimates made at this point with esti­
mates made earlier provided a measure of the extent of denial of Per­
sonal Similarity as well as Situational Possibility as a result of 
learning that the stimulus person is institutionalized for mental ill­
ness. Also, by considering the Time of Estimate of Similarity as a 
third independent variable, analysis of responses to dependent vari­
ables as a function of having "Committed" (COM) oneself to a level of 
similarity or remaining "Not Committed" (NOT COM) was possible. An 
additional comparison of the dependent variable "Prior Expectancy" 
over Time of Estimate was made possible by having "Committed" subjects 
make estimates of Prior Expectancy at this time.
Biographical Information. The final task required the subject 
to fill out a biographical questionnaire (see Appendix i). This informa­
tion was used to eliminate from the analysis anyone whose immediate 
family included someone who was currently or had been mentally ill.
Age _____
Have you ever been hospitalized for mental illness?
Has anyone in your family ever been hospitalized for
mental illness?
If so, what relation were they to you?
Debriefing and Payment of Subjects. When the subject was 
finished with all experimental tasks, the experimenter re-entered the 
experimental room to initiate debriefing. All debriefings followed a 
standard debriefing outline (see Appendix J). The major objectives of 
this session (after Ring & Farina, 19&9) were to:
(a) to determine whether and to what extent subjects
were suspicious about any of the deceptions employed
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in the experiment . . . (h) to explain in detail the
real purpose of the experiment and to justify*its
several deceptions, and (c) to allow subjects to\ex­
press their feelings and make any comments they care 
to about the experiment ^?. 682/.
Prior to leaving the experimental setting all subjects were 
asked to sign a statement of promise not to disclose information about 
the experiment (see Appendix K). Also included on this form was the
opportunity to request feedback on the completed study. All subjects
were thanked for their participation and reminded that raffle prizes 
would be awarded on February 28, 1977*
Eight raffle tickets were drawn on February 28, 1977* Each 
winner received:$10.00. All subjects requesting feedback received a 
brief statement *of the results on May 2, 1977*
RESULTS
Estimates of personal similarity and responses to the dependent 
variables dealing with attribution of responsibility, social distance, 
and attitudes toward mental illness were analyzed by a 2 x 2 x 2 analy­
sis of variance (Situational Possibility x Personal Similarity x Time 
of Estimate of Personal Similarity). Pearson product-moment correla­
tions were computed for attribution of responsibility and social dis­
tance measures. Checks on the manipulation of Situational Possibility 
and Personal Similarity were obtained by computing a 2 x 2 analysis of 
variance (Personal Similarity x Situational Possibility) on similarity 
estimates acquired from subjects prior to learning that the stimulus 
person has been hospitalized for mental illness.
Checks on the Manipulation of Situational Possibility and Personal 
Similarity
Similarity measures provided by half the subjects (U = 1+0) 
prior to receiving the information that the stimulus person has been 
hospitalized for mental illness, but after receiving information con­
cerning their similarity (or dissimilarity) to the stimulus person 
indicated that subjects were aware of the conditions to which they had 
been assigned. Subjects in the Personally Similar (SIM) condition 
indicated that they felt more similar in personality to the stimulus 
person, J? (l, 36) = 55«9U> £, < .001, than did subjects who had received 
personality profile feedback which emphasized how dissimilar (DIF) in
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Table 1
Mean Similarity and Possibility Judgments 
Made by COM Subjects
Condition
Similarity Estimate
SIM- 
HIGH POS
SIM- 
LOW POS
DIF- 
HIGH POS
DIF­
LOW POS
Estimate of 
Personal Similarity3, 5.50 5.i+o 2 .3 0 1.1+0
Estimate of ^ 
Situational Similarity 5-1*0 1.80 5.80 1.10
Estimate of 
Likelihood of Being 
in a Similar Situation 6.20 3.50 6.20 2.20
aThe higher the mean score the greater the perceived similarity.
^The higher the mean score the greater the perceived situational simi­
larity (indirect estimate of situational possibility).
The higher the mean score the greater the likelihood of being in a 
similar situation (situational possibility).
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personality they were to the stimulus person.
Subjects for whom the stimulus person was described as a "col­
lege student attending a small prestigious liberal arts college" (Situa­
tional Possibility— HIGH POS) perceived the situation of the stimulus 
person to be more like their own situation, F (l, 36) = 1U5.88, ]? <
.001, than did subjects for whom the stimulus person was described as 
a "young housewife with two children" (Situational Possibility— LOW 
POS). Also, HIGH POS subjects indicated that they felt more likely to 
be in a similar situation to the stimulus person than did LOW POS sub­
jects, F (l, 36) = 27.1i3> P K .001.
Perceived Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity by Time of 
Estimate of Similarity and Possibility Interactions '
The data confirmed the expected interaction between estimated 
Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility to the stimulus person 
as a function of the time of Similarity and Possibility estimates. 
Subjects in the SIM condition rated themselves as more similar in per­
sonality to the stimulus person when similarity ratings were made prior 
to receiving the information that the stimulus person becomes institu­
tionalized for mental illness, F (l, 72) = 6.1$, p < .05* Rather unex­
pectedly, the DIF subjects rated themselves as less dissimilar when the 
ratings were made after learning about the institutionalization, espe­
cially in the LOW POS condition.
The same pattern was apparent for estimates of Situational Simi­
larity* with HIGH POS subjects engaging in a denial of Situational Simi­
larity across time of estimate but LOW POS subjects increasing their
*Question 2 of the "similarity" estimates was actually worded 
in terms of "situational similarity" as an additional indirect measure 
of Situational Possibility.
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Table 2
Mean Estimates of Perceived Personal Similarity 
and Situational Possibility by Condition
Condition
Similarity Estimate
HIGH POS- 
COM
HIGH P0S- 
UOT COM
LOW POS- 
COM
LOW POS- 
NOT COM
Estimate of aPersonal Similarity
SIM
DIP
5-50
2.30
5.10
2.70
S-¥>
1.14.0
O 
O
 
U
M
A
 
• 
•
m 
CM
Estimate of Situa­
tional Similarity
SIM
DIP
O 
0
-d" 00
t
A
I
A
5.20
5.00
1.80
1.10
2.70
2.60
Estimate of 
Likelihood of 
Being in a Similar 
Situation0
SIM
DIP
6.20
6.20
2.70
1.1*0
3.SO 
2.20
2.70
1.50
aThe higher the mean score the greater the perceived similarity.
^The higher the mean score the greater the perceived situational simi­
larity (indirect estimate of situational possibility).
cThe higher the mean score the greater the likelihood of being in a 
similar situation (situational possibility).
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estimates of Situational Similarity, F (l, 72) = 6.73> P < *0$.
A significant Time of Estimate main effect for estimates of 
Likelihood of Being in the Same Situation (Situational Possibility) 
was witnessed such that all subjects made lower estimates of being in 
the same situation as the stimulus person when these estimates were 
made after learning that the stimulus person has been institutional- 
ized, F (l, 72) = 39*22, p < .001. Again, there was an interaction 
between Situational Possibility and Time of Estimate such that both 
HIGH POS and LOW POS subjects showed a decrease in likelihood esti­
mates, with the decrease being more pronounced for HIGH POS subjects,
F (1, 72) = 18.88, p < .001.
Attribution of Responsibility
None of the predicted interactions between Situational Possi­
bility and Personal Similarity for attribution of responsibility 
reached conventional levels of significance. Main effects for situa­
tional possibility revealed that HIGH POS subjects attributed fewer 
responsibility tokens to the environment, F (l, 72).= 5*31» P < *0£, 
and more responsibility tokens to "other causes", F (l, 72) = 
p < .05, than did LOW POS subjects. In addition to these differences 
in token distribution, there was also a tendency, F (l, 72) = 3*66, 
p < .07, for subjects in the LOW POS condition to indicate that envi­
ronmental pressures contributed more to the stimulus person's hospitali­
zation.
*In the discussion of results to follow, reference to the two 
levels of Time of Estimate of Situational Possibility and Personal 
Similarity will be achieved by using the labels for the levels of this 
variable introduced in the Methods section: COM, "Committed"— esti­
mates made prior to knowledge of institutionalization, andcN0T COM,
"Not Committed"— estimates made at the end of the experimental task.
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Table 3
Mean Scores for Attributed Responsibility 
by Conditions
Measure
Condition
HIGH POS- 
COM
HIGH POS- 
NOT COM
LOW P0S- 
COM
LOW POS- 
NOT COM
Responsibility
Tokens to the SIM 31.50 37.80 37,80 42.00
Environment DIF 34.10 35-60 43.20 40.70
Blame Tokens to SIM 30.20 1+3.50 35.30 42.00
the Environment DIF 36.50 32.1+0 42.50 38.50
Responsibility
Tokens to Other SIM 21.00 18.60 14.00 16.60
Causes DIF 21.30 23.60 14.90 17.80
Contribution of
Environmental SIM 5.50 5-70 5.50 5.90
Pressuresa DIF 5.1+0 5* 20 6.10 6.00
Intent ionality*3 SIM 2.70 2.80 2.00 4.00
DIF 3.50 2.60 3.00 2.60
Commission (Contri­
bution to Institu­ SIM 5.50 4.80 5.50 4.70
tionalization)0 DIF 5.20 5.30 4.70 5.40
Foreseeability SIM 3.60 3.00 3.00 4.60
DIF 3.90 2.70 2.50 4.20
The higher the mean score the more environmental pressures were viewed 
as contributing to the institutionalization.
^The higher the mean score the more the stimulus person was viewed as 
intending to become institutionalized.
cThe higher the mean score the more the stimulus person was viewed as 
contributing to her institutionalization.
^The higher the mean score the more the stimulus person was viewed as 
being able to foresee her institutionalization.
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Several interesting interactions were revealed between Personal 
Similarity and the Time of Estimate of that "similarity". To begin 
with, DIF-COM subjects thought the stimulus person intended to become 
institutionalized more than did subjects in the SIM-COM condition, ’ 
whereas for NOT COM subjects this differential assignment of Inten- 
tionality was reversed, _F_ (l, 72) = 5«88, p_ < .0£ * Also, SIM-COM sub­
jects assigned fewer "blame tokens" to the environment than did DIF-COM 
subjects, with this pattern again reversing for NOT COM subjects,
F (l, 72) = 1+.1|1, _P < .05>. Finally, SIM-COM subjects perceived the
stimulus person as contributing more to her institutionalization than
did SIM-NOT COM subjects, while this pattern was reversed among DIF
subjects, F (l, 72) = 6.71, < .0£.
An interaction between Situational Possibility and Time of 
Similarity Estimate revealed that HIGH POS-COM subjects thought that 
the negative consequence of becoming institutionalized was more fore­
seeable than did HIGH POS-NOT COM subjects, F (l, 72) = 12.£9, 2. < 
.001. Conversely, LOW POS-COM subjects attributed less "ibreseeability" 
than did LOW POS-NOT COM subjects.
Social Distance
Expected interactions between Situational Possibility and Per­
sonal Similarity for willingness to interact with a person who had been 
institutionalized were also not confirmed (Ffs all less than l.l).
There was a rather consistent main effect for Personal Similarity 
across levels of social distance such that SIM subjects indicated 
greater willingness than DIF subjects to Be in a Club with a stimulus 
person, F (l, 72) = 6.77> £.< *01; Room with the stimulus person,
F (l, 72) = 2+ • 1+3» £. < -05; and have the stimulus person for a Best
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Table U
Mean Social Distance Scores by Condition
a
Willingness to:
Condition
HIGH POS- 
COM
HIGH POS- 
NOT COM
LOW POS- 
COM
LOW POS- 
NOT COM
Be in a SIM U .io u .50 4.50 i+o
Club With DIF 3.70 1+.20 3.80 3 .80
Room With SIM 3.30 3 .6 0 2.90 3.U0
DIF 2.80 2 .8 0 2.60 2.70
Have as a SIM 3.10 . u .10 3 .50 3.70
Best Friend DIF 2.80 3 .4 0 2 .6 0 2.70
aThe higher the mean score the greater the willingness to interact.
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Friend, I? (l, 72) = 8.51, 2 < .01. There was also a trend, F (l, 72) = 
3.66, jd < .06, for COM subjects to indicate less willingness to have the 
stimulus person as a Best Friend as compared with NOT COM subjects.
Attitudes Toward Mentally 111 Persons
Responses to the semantic differential adjectives in the Atti­
tudes Toward Mentally 111 Persons (Davis, 1972) revealed several main 
effects for Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. Subjects 
in the SIM condition considered mentally ill persons to be more kind,
F (l, 72) = 5*63, £  <-*05> more soft, F (l, 72) = 7«17> £ < *01, and 
more yielding, F (l, 72) = 4.29> £  < .0^ , than did DIF subjects. There 
was also a tendency for SIM subjects to describe mentally ill persons 
as less strong (more weak), F (l, 72) = 3»31> P < *08.
HIGH POS subjects described mentally ill persons as being more 
calm than did LOW POS subjects, F (l, 72) = i+.76, £ < »05«
In addition to the main effects, there were several interactions 
on the evaluative adjectives. When the stimulus person described had 
been in a low possibility situation (LOW POS), the SIM subjects tended 
to describe the mentally ill persons as being more deep than did the 
DIF subjects, but no such difference was evident for HIGH POS subjects,
F (l, 72) = 3»5bt £ < .07. A two-way interaction between Personal 
Similarity and Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational 
Possibility showed SIM-COM subjects less likely to describe mentally 
ill persons as cold than SIM-NOT COM subjects, F (l, 72) = 6.1^ 6, 2 <
.05. The trend was reversed for DIF subjects. A three-way inter­
action (Situational Possibility x Personal Similarity x Time of Simi­
larity Estimate) was obtained on the adjective pair active-passive.
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Table 5
Mean Scores on Attitudes Toward Mentally 
111 Persons Scale by Conditions
Adjective Pairs3,
Condition
HIGH POS- 
COM
HIGH POS- 
NOT COM
LOW POS- 
COM
LOW POS- 
NOT COM
Kind-Cruel SIM 4.70 4.60 4.90 4.10
DIP 4.10 4.20 4.00 4.10
Hard-Soft SIM 3.10 3.30 3.50 3.80
DIP 1|. 10 • 3.60 3.90 4.io
Unyielding- SIM 3.10 3.70 3.80 4.20
Yielding DIP 4*30 4.60 3.80 4.5o
Strong-Weak SIM 2.60 3.00 2.60 2.80
DIP 3.30 3.30 3.40 3.10
Calm-Nervous SIM 2.70 3.10 2.40 2.20
DIF 3.20 2.70 2.80 2.60
Deep-Shallow SIM l+.i|0 4.70 5.io 4.60
DIP 4.90 4*60 4.00 3.80
Hot-Cold SIM k.$0 3.90 4.00 3.60
DIP 3.90 4.20 3.60 4.20
Active-Passive SIM 3.20 4.00 4.10 2.90
DIF 3.60 3.60 3.70 4.00
^ean scores indicate extent of agreement with the first adjective in 
each adjective pair.
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Similar subjects who were HIGH POS-COM described mentally ill persons 
as being less active than did HIGH POS-NOT COM subjects. Similar sub­
jects in the LOW POS-COM condition, however, rated mentally ill per­
sons as more active than did LOW POS-NOT COM subjects, F (l, 72) = U.09, 
]? < .05. No systematic differences were noted among DIF subjects.
Correlations Between Attribution and Social Distance
Correlations for each "treatment group" between attributional 
and social distance measures produced some support for the predicted 
negative correlation between assignment of personal responsibility for 
institutionalization and social distance, especially at more intimate 
levels of social distance. SIM-HIGH POS-COM subjects showed substan­
tially less willingness to Have a Class With the stimulus person, r = 
-.65, £ < .05; willingness to Work With the stimulus person, r = -.U6»
£  < .10; willingness to Share a Room, r = -.62, p < .05; and willingness 
to Have as a Best Friend, r = -*69, P < .01, when they thought the 
stimulus person could have "foreseen" her institutionalization. SIM- 
HIGH POS-NOT COM subjects also produced negative correlations between 
Foreseeability and willingness to Have a Class With, £ = -.1+7, £ < .10. 
Willingness to Share a Room With the stimulus person, r = -.53, £ < *10, 
and to have the stimulus person as a Best Friend, r = -.78, £ < .01, 
were reduced as a function of perceiving the stimulus person as having 
intended to become hospitalized.
Similarly consistent negative correlations occurred among DIF­
LOW POS-NOT COM subjects. The more the stimulus person was perceived 
as having intended to become hospitalized (Intentionality), the less 
willing subjects were to Work With the stimulus person, r = -.50, £ <
U1
Table 6
Intercorrelationsa of Attribution of Personal Responsibility 
and Willingness to Interact by Condition
Level of Interaction
Level of Responsibility 
by Condition
Class
With
Club
With
Work
With
Room
With
Best
Friend
Commission*3
SIM-HIGH POS-COM 
DIF-HIGH POS-COM 
DIF-LOW POS-COM
.63*
.51 .79** .57*
-.1*6
Want
SIM-HIGH POS-COM 
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM 
DIF-HIGH POS-NOT COM 
SIM-LOW POS-COM 
DIF-LOW POS-COM .50
• 55 
.59* 
-.50
.56*
_ -59*
Foreseeability
SIM-HIGH POS-COM 
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM 
DIF-HIGH POS-COM 
SIM-LOW POS-NOT COM 
DIF-LOW POS-NOT COM
-.6£*
-.1*7
.52
-.1*6
.58*
-.62*
-.1*6
-.69**
-.65*
• Si 
-.1*9 
.1*1
Prevention
SIM-HIGH POS-COM 
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM 
DIF-HIGH POS-COM 
DIF-HIGH POS-NOT COM 
SIM-LOW POS-COM 
SIM-LOW POS-NOT COM 
DIF-LOW POS-NOT COM
-.1*6
-.53
-.55
-.1*1
•59*
-.75**
.1*6
-.70**
Intention
SIM-HIGH POS-NOT COM 
DIF-HIGH POS-COM 
DIF-HIGH POS-NOT COM 
DIF-LOW POS-NOT COM
-.79**
-.58*
-.50
-.53
-.1*1*
-.78**
-.1*1*
aAll correlations of greater magnitude than .1*0 are reported. 
^Contribution by stimulus person to institutionalization.
*p < .05.
**p < .01.
h2
.10; Share a Room With the stimulus person, r = £ < .10; or Have
the stimulus person for a Best Friend, r = -.i+1*, £  < .10. Also, the 
more these subjects believed the stimulus person could have prevented 
her institutionalization, the less willing they were to Share a Room, 
r = £ < *10* Have the stimulus person as a Best Friend,
r = -.70* 2 < *01*
In contrast to the above mentioned pattern of negative correla­
tions, DIF-HIGH P0S-C0M subjects revealed a positive relationship be­
tween seeing the stimulus person as contributing to her hospitaliza­
tion and willingness to Work With the stimulus person, r = .51* 2 <
.10; Share a Room, £  = .79* £ < .01; and Have as a Best Friend, r = .57* 
2 < »05m Also there was a trend for increased willingness to interact 
as a function of perceiving the stimulus person as wanting to be hospi­
talized for SIM-HIGH P0S-C0M subjects (Club With, r = .55, £ < .10;
Work With, r - .59, £ < .05). Several other correlations exceeded the 
•50 level (see Table 6); however, only those correlations which show a 
consistent pattern across various levels of social distance will be 
discussed.
Prior Expectancy
Judgments of Prior Expectancy ("estimate the probability that 
someone similar to Sarah Jackson . . • would need to be hospitalized in 
a mental hospital") were higher when made by subjects after finding out 
that the stimulus person was actually hospitalized as compared to Prior 
Expectancy judgments made prior to receiving this knowledge, 3? (l, 72) = 
22.8I|., £ < .001.
DISCUSSION
Results failed to support the experimental hypotheses for 
attribution and social distance measures which predicted an interaction 
between Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity. In view of 
past experimental evidence supporting this prediction (e.g., Chaiken 
& Darley, 1973; Younger, Arrowood & Harris, 1977) it appears prudent 
to consider aspects of the current research which may have led to fail­
ure to produce this interaction rather than to discount the basic pari- 
digm for motivated distortion of attribution which led to the predic­
tion of these interactions. Checks on the manipulations of Personal 
Similarity and Situational Possibility provided clear evidence that 
these manipulations were cognitively incorporated by the subjects. A 
possible explanation for the failure to support the Situational 
Possibility-Personal Similarity predictions within the current experi­
mental design may be found in the operational definition of Situational 
Possibility. As described by Shaver (1973) situational possibility is 
defined as "the likelihood that the perceiver might find himself in 
similar circumstances" ^p. 10j, The perceiver will be motivated to 
reduce the amount of personal responsibility assigned to a stimulus 
person whenever there is a possibility that the perceiver will find him­
self in a similar situation in the future. By assigning responsibility 
to chance or environmental factors the perceiver is in effect attempt­
ing to avoid future "blame". Although college female subjects in the
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current study overwhelmingly indicated that their situation was more 
similar to the High Situational Possibility stimulus person, it is pos­
sible that they also perceived themselves as sometime in the future 
being a ’’young mother with two children". The threat of future "blame" 
may have been present for both HIGH POS and LOW POS subjects.
The main effects for Situational Possibility which revealed 
attribution of greater contribution to environmental pressure as well 
as greater assignment of responsibility tokens to the environment in 
LOW POS conditions may have been due to sympathy for a peer in a situa­
tion currently deemed as slightly socially undesirable ("young mother 
with two children"). This explanation is based on frequent informal 
comments made by subjects during the debriefing revealing awareness of 
the difficulties inherent in raising two young children. This result 
is then interpreted as an artifact of the current operational defini­
tion of Situational Possibility rather than a finding generalizable to 
more standard experimental manipulations of Situational Possibility.
Main effects for Personal Similarity provide additional experi­
mental support to earlier findings (Zimmerman, 197U) that subjects 
prefer to interact with similar disturbed others rather than dissimilar 
disturbed others. This finding is in contrast to findings by Novak and 
Lemer (1968). SIM subjects indicated preference to be in a Club With 
and Room With the stimulus person as well as to Have the stimulus per­
son as a Best Friend. Within the interpretation of the current manipu­
lations of Situational Possibility indicating that both HIGH POS and 
LOW POS subjects perceived the situation as likely to happen to them 
at some point in the future, this observed preference to interact with 
the SIM stimulus person may be taken as support of the original
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hypothesis concerning social distance and defensive attribution. That 
is, under conditions of high situational possibility subjects will act 
"defensively" to reduce the negative consequences (reduced willingness 
by others to interact socially) for institutionalization for personally 
similar stimulus persons as opposed to personally different stimulus 
persons. This reduction of the negative consequence by increasing 
willingness to interact with the stimulus person was observed, as ex­
pected, in subjects in the SIM condition. These subjects also tended 
to view mentally ill persons more positively (rated them as kinder, 
softer, less cold, and more yielding).
Of primary relevance to the interpretation of past, often 
ambiguous results as well as to future attribution research designs is 
the demonstrated denial of Personal Similarity and Situational Possi­
bility engaged in by subjects as a function of learning about the 
stimulus person’s institutionalization. Subjects who rated their 
"similarity" prior to reading about the institutionalization (COM) 
rated themselves as more personally similar, more situationally simi­
lar, and more likely to be in a similar situation as the stimulus per­
son than did NOT COM subjects who had received the same information 
relevant to Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility. This 
finding would appear to be in contrast to Brewer's (1977) view of per- 
ceivers as rational information processors.
Even more monumental in terms of future attribution research 
axe the interactions (admittedly unexpected) between several attribu­
tion and social distance measures and time of Estimate of Personal 
Similarity and Situational Possibility. It appears that subjects' 
ratings of Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity prior to
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answering experimental questions served to enhance the subjects' aware­
ness of the experimental conditions to which they had been assigned as 
compared with subjects who had not yet "committed" themselves to a 
particular level of similarity or dissimilarity. That is, if a subject 
has already estimated her level of similarity or dissimilarity, then 
she was more likely to respond to the attribution and attitudinal mea­
sures in a "defensive" manner than if she had not yet made these simi­
larity estimates.* For example, DIF-COM subjects assigned greater 
Intentionality to the stimulus person as would be predicted by a defen­
sive attribution model.** However, this trend of differential attribu­
tion of Intentionality was reversed for SIM-HOT COM and DIF-HOT COM 
subjects. Perhaps subjects are more successful in "denying" the "simi­
larity" or "dissimilarity" information which they have been given if 
they have not yet answered questions requiring - them to estimate their 
similarity to the stimulus person.
A similarly "defensive" reaction as a function of being "com­
mitted" or "not committed" to a level of Personal Similarity occurred 
in response to the adjective pair hot-cold. SIM-COM subjects rated 
mentally ill persons as being less cold than did SIM-HOT COM subjects.
A reversal of this trend was observed for DIF subjects.
Interactions between Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity 
and Situational Possibility and Personal Similarity for Contribution
*In the discussion to follow reference to levels of Time of 
Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational Possibility will 
describe the two levels as "COM" and "HOT COM".
**As discussed above, it may be that Situational Possibility was 
present for all subjects. Within this interpretation, therefore, this 
finding of differential attribution as a function of level of Personal 
Similarity may be considered support for defensive attribution.
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to Institutionalization (Commission*) and assignment of "Blame Tokens" 
to the Environment are in conflict with the above mentioned support for 
defensive attribution. SIM-COM subjects rated the stimulus person as 
Contributing more to the Institutionalization than did DIF-NOT COM sub­
jects (defensive attribution would predict the opposite). Also, DIF- 
NOT COM subjects assigned more "Blame Tokens" to the Environment than 
did SIM-COM, whereas defensive attribution would predict that the oppo­
site trend would occur. ("If I am personally similar to the stimulus 
person I will avoid future blame being assigned to me by exaggerating 
the amount of blame assigned to the environment.")
An additional interaction was apparent between Situational Pos­
sibility and Time of Estimate of Personal Similarity and Situational 
Possibility for Foreseeability such that HIGH POS-COM subjects were 
attributed more Foreseeability than LOW POS-COM subjects. Again, this 
finding is interpreted as an artifact of the current operational defini­
tion of Low Situational Possibility ("young mother with two children") 
which produced an apparent "sympathy effect" for the LOW POS stimulus 
person.
Predicted negative correlations between social distance (as 
measured by willingness to interact) and attribution of responsibility 
were supported by SIM-HIGH POS subjects as well as DIF-LOW POS subjects. 
These negative correlations appeared to be particularly prevalent at 
the intermediate level of responsibility, Foreseeability. ("If I think 
the stimulus person could have foreseen her hospitalization I will be 
less willing to interact with her.") Defensive attribution theory
*Commission is the label assigned by Shaw and Sulzer (196I4.) to 
this second level of responsibility as delineated by Heider (1958)*
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predicts that subjects in the SIM-HIGH POS conditions will feel more 
threatened by future "blameworthiness" than will subjects in other con­
ditions. The theory also predicts that these subjects will attribute 
less personal responsibility. As mentioned above, this finding was 
supported by the current research at the level of Intentionality but 
was reversed for Commission, ("Did Sarah contribute to her hospitali­
zation in any way?") It may be that at the intermediate level of 
responsibility (Foreseeability) the threat of future blameworthiness 
is manifested in reduced willingness to interact, a sort of derogation 
of the victim as proposed by Lemer's "Just World" hypothesis (Lerner, 
1965). However, at the next level of responsibility, Intentionality, 
defensive attribution seems to come into play. This explanation of 
the current results tends to support suggestions by Pishbein and Azjen 
(1973) that delineation of the levels of responsibility a la Heider 
(1958) might serve to reduce the ambiguity of attribution research 
findings.
It would appear, also, that perhaps some of the potential 
ambiguity of results in defensive attribution experimental paradigms 
may be reduced by enhancing subjects1 "commitment" to the experimental 
condition to which they have been assigned by having subjects behavior- 
ally indicate the extent of their Similarity or Dissimilarity to the 
stimulus person before finding out about the negative consequence in 
which the stimulus person has been involved and prior to answering 
experimental questions. It is feasible that this enhancement in future 
research of those factors deemed as essential for motivated distortion 
of attribution (defensive attribution) would result in a more accurate 
assessment of the strength of the phenomenon.
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Finally, data provided at least partial support for the hypo­
thesis that the more personally responsible the stimulus person is con­
sidered to be for the negative consequence (institutionalization in the 
current design) the less the subjects will be willing to interact with 
the stimulus person. If the subject views the stimulus person as 
responsible for the negative consequence which has befallen him/her, 
then the subject will feel more justified in being hesitant to inter­
act with the stimulus person, especially at more intimate levels of 
interaction. Although this theoretical explanation of the relation­
ship between personal responsibility and social distance requires much 
more empirical support than that which has been offered here, it could 
(if additional empirical support were provided) offer very valuable 
practical utility in promoting community attitude change to facilitate 
 ^re-entry of clinical populations to community settings. It may be 
that an effective way to reduce often-witnessed hesitancy to interact 
with mentally ill persons would be to emphasize the contribution of 
environmental (non-personal) factors to the resultant mental illness.
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100
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10
SCALE
Your p e r c e n t i l e  s c o r e  on e a c h  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  
s c a l e s  h a s  b e e n  c h a r t e d  a b o v e .  I t  i s  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t e l l  
you a t  t h i s  p o i n t  what t h e  s c a l e s  s t a n d  f o r .  T h i s  w i l l  be  
e x p l a i n e d  t o  yo u  a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t .  T h i s  I n f o r m a ­
t i o n  i s  p r o v i d e d  h o w e v e r  s o  t h a t  you c a n  s e e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  you  
a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  o r  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h e  p e r s o n  a b o u t  whom you w i l l  
b e  r e a d i n g .  P l e a s e  com pare  y o u r  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f
lcSe>kv________________. ( s e e  n e x t  p a g e )
3ERSONALITY PROFILE OF
100
I
> 90I
f
I 80
!
70  
) 60 
\
: 50
}
; 4o
)
: 30
i
- 20 
10
5 6 7 
SCALE ‘
10
Your p e r c e n t i l e  s c o r e  on e a c h  o f  t h e  p e r s o n a l i t y  
s c a l e s  h a s  b e e n  c h a r t e d  a b o v e .  I t  I s  n o t  a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  t e l l  
you a t  t h i s  p o i n t  what t h e  s c a l e s  s t a n d  f o r .  T h i s  w i l l  b e  
e x p l a i n e d  t o  y ou  a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  e x p e r i m e n t . T h i s  i n f o r m a ­
t i o n  i s  p r o v i d e d  h o w e v e r  s o  t h a t  you c a n  s e e  w h e t h e r  o r  n o t  you  
a r e  s i m i l a r  t o  o r  d i f f e r e n t  from  t h e  p e r s o n  a b o u t  whom y o u  w i l l  
b e  r e a d i n g .  P l e a s e  com pare  y o u r  r e s u l t s  w i t h  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  
■fr-U  . ( s e e  n e x t  p a g e )
i a (4)
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PARTICIPANT ’ S CONSENT ^OFM
I a ^ r e e  t o  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  t h e  p r o j e c t  c o n d u c t e d  by  
N s .  P h y l l i s  O ksner  w h ic h  i s  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  m aking  d e c i s i o n s  
a b o u t  p e o p l e .  I  an f u l l y  aw a re  t h a t  i f  I  n a y  ™ish t o  
t e r m i n a t e  my i n v o l v e m e n t  a t  any  n o i n t  d u r i n g  my p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  
I  may do s o .
S i g n a t u r e  o f  P a r t i c i p a n t
 ---
RAFFLE TICKET
Marne________________________________________ .
A d d r e s s
T e l e p h o n e  Number
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Stimulus Person Profile
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SCALE
You w i l l  be  a n s w e r i n g  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  S a r a h  J a c k s o n  b a s e d  
on l i m i t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  h e r .  S a r a h  i s  a s t u d e n t  a t  a s m a l l ,  
p r e s t i g i o u s  l i b e r a l  a r t s  c o l l e g e .  The p r e s s u r e s  o f  h e r  c l a s s e s  
a r e  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  y o u r s .  She i s  a s e n i o r  and I s  m a i n t a i n i n g  
a "B" a v e r a g e .
B a se d  on t h e  I n f o r m a t i o n  you h a v e  j u s t  r e a d ,  n l e a s e  a n s w e r  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  S a r a h  J a c k s o n .  ( s e e  n e x t  p a g e )
(5) 1
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PERSONALITY PROFILE OF
300
90
80
70
60
50
30
20
30
3 86 302 3 75 9
SCALE
You w i l l  b e  a n s w e r i n g  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  S a r a h  J a c k s o n  
b a s e d  on l i m i t e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  h e r .  S a r a h  i s  a young  
m o th e r  ( t w e n t y - o n e )  w i t h  two c h i l d r e n .  The p r e s s u r e s  o f  
h e r  s i t u a t i o n  a r e  v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  from  y o u r s .
B a se d  on t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  you h a v e  j u s t  r e a d ,  p l e a s e  
a n s w e r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  q u e s t i o n s  a b o u t  S a r a h  J a c k s o n .
( s e e  n e x t  p a g e )
(5) 2
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APPENDIX D 
Estimates of Personal Similarity 
and Situational Possibility
QUESTION SHEET A
How s i m i l a r  i n  p e r s o n a l i t y  do you c o n s i d e r  y o u r s e l f  t o  
b e  t o  S a r a h  J a c k s o n ?  (C heck  o n e )
 V e r y  S i m i l a r
 M o d e r a t e l y  S i m i l a r
S l i g h t l y  S i m i l a r
S l i g h t l y  D i s s i m i l a r
_M oderate ly  D i s s i m i l a r  
V e r y  D i s s i m i l a r
(7)
How s i m i l a r  a r e  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  w h ic h  S a r a h  J a c k s o n  
e x p e r i e n c e s  t o  t h e  p r e s s u r e s  w h ic h  you e x p e r i e n c e ?
(C h ec k  o n e )
 V e ry  S i m i l a r
_M o d era te ly  S i m i l a r  
J S l i g h t l y  S i m i l a r
Not  p a r t i c u l a r l y  S i m i l a r  o r  D i s s i m i l a r  
S l i g h t l y  D i s s i m i l a r  
M o d e r a t e l y  D i s s i m i l a r  
V e r y  D i s s i m i l a r
(9)_
What do you t h i n k  a r e  t h e  c h a n c e s  o u t  o f  10 t h a t  you  
m i g h t  f i n d  y o u r s e l f  i n  t h e  same s i t u a t i o n  a s  S a r a h  
J a c k s o n ?  ( C i r c l e  o n e )
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Written Instructions to Subjects
INSTRUCTIONS
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T h i s  b o o k l e t  c o n t a i n s  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  
S a r a h  J a c k s o n .  B e f o r e  opening; t h e  b o o k l e t  p l a c e  t h e  
q u e s t i o n  s h e e t  you h a v e  j u s t  a n s w e r e d  ( l a b e l e d  QUESTION 
SHEET A) i n  t h e  e n v e l o p e  i n c l u d e d  i n  y o u r  f o l d e r .  S e a l  
t h e  e n v e l o p e .  DO NOT REOPEN THIS ENVELOPE.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Many o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  you w i l l  be  a n s w e r i n g  a r e  In  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  f o r m a t :
How much do you e n j o y  b e i n g  a s t u d e n t  a t  W i l l i a m  and Mary? 
( p u t  an X on t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l i n e  f o r  e a c h  a n s w e r )
V e ry  Much: : : : : : :  :Not At A l l
1 * 2 3 “ 5 5 "5 7
An X on l i n e  1 wou ld  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  you  l i k e  b e i n g  a 
s t u d e n t  a t  W i l l i a m  and Mary v e r y  much; an  X on l i n e  2 w ou ld  
i n d i c a t e  m o d e r a t e  l i k i n g ;  an x on l i n e  3 w ou ld  i n d i c a t e  
s l i g h t  l i k i n g ;  an X on l i n e  4 I n d i c a t e s  t h a t  you h a v e  no  
o p i n i o n  on t h e  i s s u e ;  an X on l i n e  5 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  you a r e  
s l i g h t l y  unhappy a t  W i l l i a m  and Mary; an X on l i n e  6 i n d i c a t e s  
m o d e r a t e  u n h a p p i n e s s ;  and an X on l ine" 7 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
you  a r e  n o t  a t  a l l  happy a t  W i l l i a m  and Mary. For p r a c t i c e ,  
p l a c ;e an X on t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  l i n e *
^The numbers  do n o t  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  q u e s t i o n n a i r e .  They  
a r e  i n c l u d e d  h e r e  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  t h e  t a s k .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
A s e c o n d  t y p e  o f  q u e s t i o n  f o l l o w s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f o r m a t :
P l e a s e  d i v i d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  h a p p i n e s s  t o k e n s  among 
t h e  f o u r  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  may c o n t r i b u t e  t o  y o u r  h a p p i n e s s  a t  
W i l l i a m  and Mary: y o u r s e l f  ( Y ) ,  f r i e n d s  (F )  , c l a s s e s  ( C ) ,
o r  o t h e r  ( 0 ) .  Draw a c i r c l e  aro u n d  t h e  number o f  t o k e n s  
you w i s h  t o  a s s i g n  t o  e a c h  f a c t o r  and l a b e l  e a c h  c i r c l e  w i t h  
t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  f a c t o r  (Y ,  F ,  C, add 0 ) . * #
N o t e  t h a t  a l l  t o k e n s  a r e  u s e d  i n  t h e  t a s k .  I t  i s  n o t
n e c e s s a r y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t o  a s s i g n  t o k e n s  t o  a l l  f a c t o r s .
YOU MAY PROCEDE TO THE NEXT PAGE.
* # T h i s  e x a m p le  h a s  a l r e a d y  b e e n  c o m p l e t e d  f o r  y o u .
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Attribution Measures
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PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT SARAH JACKSON.
Sarhh  J a c k s o n  had r e c e n t l y  b e e n  u n d e r  a g r e a t  
d e a l  o f  p r e s s u r e  a t  s c h o o l .  The p r e s s u r e s  o f  b e i n g  
a s e n i o r  a t  a  s m a l l  p r e s t i g i o u s  s c h o o l  had become  
more t h a n  s h e  c o u l d  h a n d l e .  One w e e k - e n d ,  d u r i n g  
e x a m s ,  s h e  became s o  d e p r e s s e d  t h a t  s h e  c r i e d  c o n ­
t i n u o u s l y  and h y s t e r i c a l l y  f o r  s e e m i n g l y  no r e a s o n  
a t  a l l .  Her roommate s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  s h e  s h o u l d  
s e e k  h e l p  a t  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  c o u n s e l i n g  c e n t e r .  The  
p s y c h o l o g i s t  a t  t h e  c o u n s e l i n g  c e n t e r  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  
s h e  s o u i d  go  t o  W e s t s i d e  M e n ta l  H o s p i t a l  f o r  a f e w  
w e e k s  t o  p u l l  h e r s e l f  t o g e t h e r .  S a r a h  h a s  b e e n  a t  
W e s t s i d e  f o r  two w eek s  and i s  d o i n g  much b e t t e r .
NOW, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ABOUT SARAH JACKSON.
(PUT AN X ON THE APPROPRIATE LINE FOR EACH ANSWER)
1 .  Do you t h i n k  S a r a h  c o n t r i b u t e d  i n  any  way t o  
h e r  h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n ?
C o n t r i b u t e d :  : : : : : :  :D id  Not C o n t r i b u t e
" (16)______
: 2 .  Do you  t h i n k  S ar a h  w a n ted  t o  be'come' h o s p i t a l i z e d ?
No: : : : : : : :Yes
; (18)___
3 .  Do you t h i n k  S a r a h  c o u l d  h a v e  f o r e s e e n  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  s h e  w o u ld  be  h o s p i t a l i z e d ?
Y e s :  : : : : : :  :No
(20)____
*1. Do you  t h i n k  S a r a h  c o u l d  h a v e  d o n e  a n y t h i n g  t o  
p r e v e n t  b e c o m in g  h o s p i t a l i z e d ?
No: : : : : : :  :Yes
(22)____
5 .  How much 4o  you t h i n k  S a r a h ' s  a c a d e m ic  p r e s s u r e s  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  h e r  n e e d i n g  t o  be  h o s p i t a l i z e d ?
C o n t r i b u t e d :  : : : : : : :D id  Not C o n t r i b u t e
(2H)_____
6 .  Do you  t h i n k  S a r a h  i n t e n d e d  t o  become h o s p i t a l i z e d ?  
No: : : : : : : :Yes
(26)_____
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7 .  P l e a s e  d i v i d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  t o k e n s  
among t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s  vjhlch may h a v e  b e e n  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  S a r a h ' s  h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n :  S a r a h ( S ) ,
t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  s c h o o l )  ( E ) ,  c h a n c e  ( C ) ,  
o r  o t h e r  c a u s e s  ( 0 ) .  Draw a c i r c l e  a ro u n d  t h e  number  
o f  t o k e n s  you  w i s h  t o  a s s i g n  t o  e a c h  f a c t o r  and  
l a b e l  e a c h  c i r c l e  w i t h  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  * 
f a c t o r  ( S ,  E ,  C, and 0 ) .
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
8 .  P l e a s e  d i v i d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b lam e t o k e n s  among t h e  
f a c t o r s  w h ic h  may be  b lam ed f o r  S a r a h ' s  h o s p i t a l i ­
z a t i o n :  S a r a h  ( S ) ,  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  s c h o o l )
( E ) ,  c h a n c e  ( C ) , o r  o t h e r  c a u s e s  ( 0 ) .  Draw a c i r c l e  
around t h e  number o f  b la m e  t o k e n s  you  w i s h  t o  a s s i g n  
t o  e a c h  f a c t o r  and l a b e l  e a c h  c i r c l e  w i t h  t h e  
a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  f a c t o r  ( S ,  E ,  C, and 0 ) .
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
9 .  Do you  t h i n k  S a r a h  w i l l  n e e d  t o  b e  h o s p i t a l i z e d  i n  
t h e  f u t u r e  ( i n  a m e n t a l  h o s p i t a l ) ?
Y e s :_____ : _____:______: _________  :__ :_____ :No
( 5 2 ) ______
1 0 ,  THIS QUESTION I S  OPTIONAL
Can you w r i t e  a s h o r t  p a r a g r a p h  a d v i s i n g  S a r a h  
on how t o  a v o i d  b e i n g  h o s p i t a l i z e d  ( i n  a m e n t a l  h o s p i t a l )  
i n  t h e  f u t u r e ?  I f  s o ,  w r i t e  y o u r  p a r a g r a p h  on t h e  b a c k  
o f  t h i s  s h e e t .
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PLEASE HEAD THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ABOUT SARAH JACKSON.
S a r a h  J a c k s o n  had r e c e n t l y  b e e n  u n d e r  a g r e a t  
d e a l  o f  p r e s s u r e  a t  home. The p r e s s u r e s  o f  b e i n g  a 
y o u n g  m o t h e r  w i t h  two s m a l l  c h i l d r e n ,  had becom e more  
t h a n  s h e  c o u l d  h a n d l e .  One w e e k - e n d  s h e  becam e so  
d e p r e s s e d  t h a t  s h e  c r i e d  c o n t i n u o u s l y  and h y s t e r i c a l l y  
f o r  s e e m i n g l y  no r e a s o n  a t  a l l .  Her h u sb and  s u g g e s t e d  
t h a t  s h e  s h o u l d  s e e k  h e l p  a t  t h e  l o c a l  C r i s i s  I n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  C e n t e r .  The p s y c h o l o g i s t  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  
s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  s h e  should ,^go  t o  W e s t s i d e  M e n ta l  
H o s p i t a l  f o r  a f e w  w eek s  t o  p u l l  h e r s e l f  t o g e t h e r .  
S a r a h  h a s  b e e n  a t  W e s t s i d e  f o r  tw o  w eek s  and i s  d o i n g  
much b e t t e r .
NOW, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ABOUT SARAH JACKSON.
(PTT AN X ON THE APPROPRIATE LINE FOR EACH ANSWER)
1 .  Do you t h i n k  S a r a h  c o n t r i b u t e d  I n  any  way t o  
h e r  h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n ?
C o n t r i b u t e d :  : : : : : :  :D id  Not  C o n t r i b u t e
(16)____
2 .  Do you t h i n k  S a r a h  w a n ted  t o  becom e h o s p i t a l i z e d ?
No: : : : : : :  :Yes
(18) __
3 .  Do you  t h i n k  S a r a h  c o u l d  h a v e  f o r e s e e n  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  s h e  w o u ld  b e  h o s p i a a l i z e d ?
Y e s :  : : : : : :  :No
(20)____
k . Do you t h i n k  S a r a h  c o u l d  h a v e  d o n e  a n y t h i n g  t o  
p r e v e n t  b e c o m in g  h o s p i t a l i z e d ?
No: : : : : : :  :Yes
(22)____
5 .  How much do you t h i n k  S a r a h ’ s home p r e s s u r e s  
c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  h e r  n e e d i n g  t o  be  h o s p i t a l i z e d ?
C o n t r i b u r e d :  : : : : : :  :D id  Not C o n t r i b u t e
(2*0____
6 .  Do you  t h i n k  S a r a h  i n t e n d e d  t o  becom e h o s p i t a l i z e d ?  
No: : : : : : : :Y es
(26)_____
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7 .  P l e a s e  d i v i d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  r e s p o n s i c i l i t y  t o k e n s  
among t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s  w h ic h  may h a v e  b e e n  
r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  S a r a h ’ s h o s p i t a l i z a t i o n :  S a r a h ( S ) ,
t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  h e r  f a m i l y )  ( E ) , c h a n c e  ( C ) ,  
o r  o t h e r  c a u s e s  ( 0 ) .  Draw a c i r c l e  arou n d  t h e  number  
o f  t o k e n s  you w i s h  t o  a s s i g n  t o  e a c h  f a c t o r  and  
l a b e l  e a c h  c i r c l e  w i t h  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  
f a c t o r  ( S ,  E ,  C, 0 ) .
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R R
8 .  P l e a s e  d i v i d e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  b la m e  t o k e n s  among t h e  
f a c t o r s  w h ic h  may be  b lam ed f o r  S a r a h ’ s h o s p i t a l i ­
z a t i o n :  S a r a h  ( S ) ,  t h e  e n v i r o n m e n t  ( e s p e c i a l l y  h e r
f a m i l y )  ( E ) , c h a n c e  ( C ) ,  o r  o t h e r  c a u s e s  ( 0 ) .  Draw 
a c i r c l e  a rou n d  t h e  number o f  b la m e  t o k e n s  you w i s h  
t o  a s s i g n  t o  e a c h  f a c t o r  and l a b e l  e a c h  c i r c l e  w i t h  
t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  f o r  t h e  f a c t o r  ( S ,  E ,  C, 0 ) .
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B B
9 .  Do you t h i n k  S a r a h  w i l l  n e e d  t o  be  h o s p i t a l i z e d  i n  
t h e  f u t u r e  ( i n  a m e n t a l  h o s p i t a l ) ?
Y e s :  : : : : : :  :No
( 5 2 )
] 0 .  THIS QUESTION IS  0TTI0NAL
Can you w r i t e  a s h o r t  p a r a g r a p h  a d v i s i n g  S ar a h  
on how t o  a v o i d  b e i n g  h o s p i t a l i z e d  ( i n  a m e n t a l  h o s p i t a l )  
i n  t h e  f u t u r e ?  I f  s o ,  w r i t e  y o u r  p a r a g r a p h  on t h e  
b a c k  o f  t h i s  s h e e t .
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1 1 .  How w i l l i n g  w ou ld  you be  t o  h a v e  a c l a s s  w i t h  
S a r a h  J a c k s o n ?  (C h eck  o n e )
 D e f i n i t e l y  W i l l i n g
 P r o b a b l y  W i l l i n g
J J n d ec id e d  
P r o b a b l y  U n w i l l i n g
D e f i n i t e l y  U n w i l l i n g  ( 6 3 )
1 2 . .  How w i l l i n g  w o u ld  you b e  t o  h a v e  S a r a h  J a c k s o n  a s  a  member 
i n  a c l u b  t h a t  you w e re  a member o f ?  (C h eck  o n e )
 D e f i n i t e l y  W i l l i n g
P r o b a b l y  W i l l i n g  
U n d e c i d e d
P r o b a b l y  U n w i l l i n g
D e f i n i t e l y  U n w i l l i n g  ( 6 5 )
13«i How w i l l i n g  w ou ld  you  b e  t o  work w i t h  S ar a h  J a c k s o n ?
(C h eck  o n e )
  D e f i n i t e l y  W i l l i n g
______ P r o b a b l y  W i l l i n g
U n d e c i d e d
P r o b a b l y  U n w i l l i n g
D e f i n i t e l y  U n w i l l i n g  ( 6 7 )
1*1. How w i l l i n g  w ou ld  you b e  t o  s h a r e  a room w i t h  
S a r a h  J a c k s o n ?  (C h eck  o n e )
 D e f i n i t e l y  W i l l i n g
  P r o b a b l y  W i l l i n g
U n d e c i d e d  
P r o b a b l y  U n w i l l i n g
D e f i n i t e l y  U n w i l l i n g  ( 6 9 )
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1 5 .  How w i l l i n g  w ou ld  you be t o  h a v e  S a r a h  J a c k s o n  a s  a 
b e s t  f r i e n d ?  (C h eck  o n e )
 D e f i n i t e l y  W i l l i n g
Pr o b a b l y  W i l l i n g
 _Und ec  i d  ed
 P r o b a b l y  U n w i l l i n g
  D e f i n i t e l y  U n w i l l i n g  ( 7 D
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INSTRUCTIONS
On t h e  n e x t  p a g e  you w i l l  f i n d  s e v e r a l  a d j e c t i v e s  
v /h ich  may be  u s e d  t o  d e s c r i b e  p e o p l e .  The a d j e c t i v e s  a r e  
l i s t e d  a s  p a i r s  o f  o p p o s i t e s  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  manner:
FAT:______ :_______:______ :_______ :_______: _______: ______ :THIN
Your t a s k  i s  t o  p l a c e  an X on t h a t  l i n e  w h ic h  b e s t  d e s c r i b e s  
M e n t a l l y  111  P e r s o n s .
F o r  i n s t a n c e ,  i f  you t h i n k  M e n t a l l y  11 1  P e r s o n s  a r e  
g e n e r a l l y  r a t h e r  f a t  you m i g h t  mark t h e  I t e m  a s  f o l l o w s :
FAT:_______: X_:______ :_______:_______: _______:______ :THIN
I f  you  t h i n k  t h e y  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  t h i n ,  you  m i g h t  mark t h e  
i t e m  t h i s  way:
.FAT: : : : : : X : : THIN
t
IF  YOU STILL DO NOT UNDERSTAND YOUR TASK, YOU 
MAY ASK MS. OKSNER TO EXPLAIN IT TO YOU IN MORE DETAIL.
MENTALLY ILL PERSONS
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GOOD:
EMOTIONAL:
DISREPUTABLE:
STRONG:
SHALLOW:
PASSIVE:
EXCITABLE:
% » .*. K *
-.KIND: 
SOFT: 
UNSUCCESSFUL: 
EMPTY: 
HOT: 
PLEASANT: 
TENACIOUS: 
GENTLE: 
SANE:
:BAD (10a
: RATIONAL (12;
:REPUTABLE (Ike
:WEAK
:DEEP
ACTIVE
: CALM
:CRUEL
:HARD
(16;
(18a
( 20c
(22e
(2*»;
( 26;
: SUCCESSFUL (28;
FULL
: COLD
(30;
(32:
:UNPLEASANT (3^
:YIELDING ( 3 6
VIOLENT (3 8
: INSANE (iJC
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BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION (DO NOT SIGN YOUR NAME TO THIS FORM!)
Age _____  ( 4 8 a )
Have you  e v e r  b e e n  h o s p i t a l i z e d  f o r  m e n t a l  i l l n e s s ?
Y e s ______
No ( 5 0 a )
Has a n y o n e  I n  y o u r  f a m i l y  e v e r  b e e n  h o s p i t a l i z e d  f o r  m e n t a l  
i l l n e s s ?
Yes
No._______  ( 5 2 a )
I f  s o ,  what  r e l a t i o n  w e r e  t h e y  t o  you?
______________________________________________  ( 5 4 a ) .
Where do you  work now?
_____________________  ( 5 6 a ) .
How l o n g  h a v e  you  worked a t  y o u r  c u r r e n t  j o b ?  
____________________________   ( 6 o a )
What was t h e  l a s t  g r a d e  y ou  c o m p l e t e d  I n  s c h o o l ?
(64a)
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DEBRIEFING OUTLINE
I .  How d i d  you f e e l  w h i l e  a n s w e r i n g  t h e  q u e s t i o n s ?
A. D id  you f e e l  any  s t r e s s ?
B. Were you  s u s p i c i o u s  o f  a n y  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  g i v e n  
t o  you?
I I .  D i s c l o s u r e  o f  a c t u a l  t e s t  r e s u l t s  and n e c e s s i t y  f o r  d e c e p t i o n .  
E l i .  A s s u r a n c e  t h a t  a l l  i n f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  be  k e o t  a n o n y m ou s .
IV .  S i g n i n g  o f  s t a t e m e n t  t o  w i t h h o l d  d i s c l o s u r e .
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I  r e a l i z e  t h a t  i t  i s  v e r y  i m p o r t a n t  n o t  t o  t e l l  
a n y o n e  a b o u t  any p a r t  o f  t h e  s t u d y  i^rhich I  h a v e  ,1ust p a r t i c i ­
p a t e d  i n  u n t i l  F e b r u a r y  2 8 ,  1 9 7 7 .  I  u n d e r s t a n d  t h a t  any  
s u c h  d i s c l o s u r e  on my p a r t  w i l l  make me i n e l i g i b l e  t o  w in  a 
r a f f l e  p r i z e .
S i g n a t u r e  o f  P a r t i c i p a n t
Do you w i s h  t o  r e c e i v e  a summary o f  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  s t u d y ?
No________
Y e s ________
I f  y e s ,  p l e a s e  l i s t  y o u r  a d d r e s s  b e l o w :
APPENDIX L 
Summary Tables
r SUMMARY TABLE F.GR VARIABLE Is PERSONAL SIMILARITY
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE
JV?. SIL.P_O S.rNOT.
B.t.PEBS „S IM-NOJ
XxENVI SiJM-E ST
*L_EL
A * C
,_8 _
 A*B*C
. 9 . 6 0 0  
. 1 4 0 . 4 5  0
...... q.aoo
 0 . 4 5 0
 0 .800.
1 3 . 0 5 0  
_ 6 . 0 5 0
5 . 8 0 0
1 4 0 . 4 5 0
C.  8 0 0
2 . 3 3 3
0 . 3 , 0 0
1 8 . 0 5 0
G • 272 . .
0 . 4 5 0  C . 1 5 3
C . 2 7 2
6 . 0 5 0  2 . 0 6 1
..ERROR. 2 1 1 . 4 0  0 .72 2 . 9 3 6
SUMMARY t Ad L E F G R " V A KI ARLt 2: SITUATIONAL POSSIBILITY.
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE
A: SI T POS-NOT
B : PERS SIM—NOT
C: ENVL. SIM-EST
A * 3
A * C
B * C
A*B*C
ERROR
2 1 7 . 3 0 0
0 . 4 5  0  
 2 .  45 0
_ _ 1-. 250
1 4 » 4 5  0
/
-0.poo
1 .  8 0 0  
1 5 4 . 6 0 0
2 1 7 . BGo!  1 0 1 . 4 3 3  
C . 4 5 0  0 . 2 1 0
2 . 4 5 0  1 * 141
1 . 2 5 0  C . 5 8 2
1 4 . 4 5 0
— C• 0 0 0  -C. GOO
1 . 8 0 0  C . 8 3 8
72 2 . 1 4 7
^'suMHARy~ TABLE “FOR VARIABLE 3 T  L IK6 L IHUUD UF BEING IN SAME SITUATION
L
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE F
_ A  2 SI T ,_POS-NOT  ....... ....... 54. . 45. 0  1 . 5 4 , 4 5 0  (l7^TQ3^
_.. . B :.PE RS S IM— NOT .__  1 3 ,  05  0 1 . 1 8 , 0 5 0  5 . 8 5 7
„,JC:ENV.L._SIM~EST___________1 2 0 .  0 50 ..........  1 .........................1 2 0 . 0 5 0  . ^ T T T i a ^
 _____     ._________J U . 8 0 Q . _ _ ...........  JL...  1 . 8 0 0  C . 5 8 3
 A-JLX.______________________ __J>~7.  8 0 0  -    1 _ .. 5 7 . 8 0 0  _ ^ f s T s 8 2 ^
 *„_£.......      _...................... 1 .  8 0 0  ..   1 . 1 .  8 0 0  C . 5 8 8 .
 A*B*C _ r_________ ______2 . 4 5 0 ^   ............. 1 ............................. 2 . 4 5 0  C . 8 0 0
____EURO R ________ ____________ 2 2 0 . .4 0 0 ..........__..  .72.   3 . 0 6 1
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 'I: PRICK EXPECTANCY
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES OF MEAN SC U ARE F
A: SI T POS-NCT 1 1 2 . 8 1 3 1 1 1 2 . 8 1 3 C .  2 4 1
8: PERS SI M- NCI 4 7 5 . 3 1 2 1 4 7 5 . 3 1 3 J . C 1 6
C: ENVL SI M- EST 1 0 6 9 5 . 3 1 6 1 1 0 6 9 5 .  3 i o 2 2 . 6 5 4
A # B 8 9 1 . 1 1 3 1 8 9 1 . 1 1 3 1 . 9 0 4
A * C 2 C 8 . C 1 3 1 2 0 8 . 0 1 3 C . 4 4 4
B * C 9 0 . 3 1 3 1 9 0 . 3 1 3 C . 1 9  3
A*B*C 3 0 . 0 1 3 1 3 0 . 0 1 3 C • C64
FRRQR 3 3 6 9 5 . 3 0 0 72 4 6  7 . 9 9 0
UMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 2 :  COMMISSION
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 0 . 3 1 3 1 0 . 3 1 3 C. 2  17
B: PERS SIM-NOT 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 . 0 1 3 C . C1 3
CsENVL SI M- EST 0 . 6 1 3 1 0 . 6 1 3 C . 6 2 2
......A *' B 0 . 1 1 3 1 0 . 1 1 3 C . 114
A * C 0 . 3 1 3 1 . 0 . 3 1 3 C . 2 1 7
B * C 6 . 6 1 3 1 6 . 6 1 3 6 . 7 1 5
A*B*C 0 . 6 1 3 1 0 . 6 1 3 C . 6  22
ERROR 7 0 . 9 0 0 7 2 C . 5 8 5
UMMARY r A 13 L b FCR VARIABLE .3! WANTED 10 BE HI S P I T AL I Z t C
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES □ F MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 7 . 8 1 3 1 7 . 8 1 3 2 . 5 2 6
B : PFRS SLM-NUT 7 . 8 1 3 1 7 . 8 1 3 4L . 5 2 6
C:ENVL SIM- EST 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 C . 2 2 7
A * B 1 . 0 1 3 l' 1 . 0 1 3 C . 2 2 7
A * C 5 . 5 1 3 1 5 . 5 1 3 1 • 7 62
B * C 2 . 8 1 3 I 2 . 8 1 3 C. 9 C9
A*9*C 0 . 3 1 3 1 C .  3 1 3 C . 1 0 1
ERROR 2 2 2 . 7 0 0 72 3 . C 9 3
UMMARY TABLE FCR VARIABLE 4:  FORESEEABILITY
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
As SI T POS-NOT 1 . 5 1 3 1 1 . 5 1 3 C • 56 6
Bi PERS SIM-NOT 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 C .  3 9 2
C : ENVL SI M- EST 2 . 8 1 3 1 2 . 8 1 3 l . C  89
A *"B 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 C . 3 5 2
A * C 3 2 . 5 1 3 1 3 2 . 5 1 3 1 2 . 5  92
B * C 0 . 3 1 3 1 C . 3 1 3 C.  121
A*8*C 0 . 6 1 3 1 0 . 6 1 3 C . 2 3 7
ERROR 1 8 5 . 9 0 0 7 2 2 . 5 8 2
, UMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 5: PREVENTION BY SARAH
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 1 . 8 0  0 1 1 . 8 0  0 C • S 32
6 : PEPS SiM-NOT 0 . 2 0 0 1 C.2CG C . 104
C: ENVL SIM-EST 0 . 4 5  0 1 0 * 4 5 0 C .  2 33
A * B 1 . 8 0 0 1 1 . 3 0 0 C . 5 3 2
A * C 2 . 4 5 0 1 2 . 4 5 0 1 . 2 6 9
8 * C 0 . 0 5 0 1 0 . 0 5 0 C . C 2 6
A*8*C G.G5C 1 C. C5Q C . 0 2 6
ERROR 1 3 9 . 0 0 0 7 2 1 . 9 3  I
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 6 :  CCNTR IBUTIGN QF F-CME PRESSURES
SOURCE SUM QF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A:SIT POS-NOT 3 . 6 1 3 I 2.612 3 . 6 6 9
B: PFRS S Ih-NOT 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 . 0 1 3 C . 0 1 3
C: ENVL SIM- EST 0 . 1 1 3 1 C. 1 1 3 C . 1 1 4
... A * B 2 .  113 1 2 . 1 1 3 2 . 1 4 5
..A * C 0 .  113 1 0 . 1 1 3 C . 1 1 4
S * C 1 . 0 1 2 1 1 . 0 1 3 1 . 0 2 8
A*B*C 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 . 0 1 3 C. C1 3
ERROR 7 0 . 9 0 0 72 C . 9 3 5
NUMMARY TABLE. FuR VARIABLE 7: INTENTlUNALITY
SOURCE SUM.OF SQUARES OF Ml AN. SQUARE F
A: SET FOS-NUT O.COC 1 C . 0 0 0 C .COO
B: PERS SIM-NOT 0 * 0 5 C 1 0 . u ? u C . 0 2 0
CsENVL SIM-EST C • 8 0 0  1 C • 80 0 C . 2 2 5
A * B 1 . 2 5 0  1 1 . 2 5 0 C . 5 0 8
... A *' C 7 . 2 0 0  1 7 . 2 0 0 2 . 5 2 9
8 # C 1 4 . 4 5 0  1 1 4 . 4 5 0 5 . t  7 a
A*8*C 2 . 4 5 0  1 2 . 4 5 0 C . 5 5 7
ERROR 1 7 7 . 0 0 0  72 2 . 4 5 8
SUMMARY TABLE FCR- VARIABLE 8:  RESPONSIBI LI TY TOKENS TG SARAH
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE F
A : SI T POS-NOT 6 4 . 8 0 0  1 6 4 . 8 0 0 C . 2 5 9
B: PER S' SIM-NQT 2 5 2 . 0 5 0  1 2 5 2 . 0 5  0 1 .00 8
C: ENVL SIM-EST 3 9 . 2 0 0  1 35.200 C . 1 5 7
A * 8 3 9 . 2 0 0  1 35.200 C. 157
...  A * C 6 1 . 2 5 0  1 6 1 . 2 5 0 C . 2 4 5
8 * C 7 . 2 0 0  1 7 . 2 0 0 C. C29
A*B*C 1 0 1 . 2 5 0  I 1 0 1 . 2 5 0 C . 4 0 5
F RROR 1 7 9 S 5 . 0 0 Q  72 2 4 9 . 9 3 1
...
j.MMAKY TABLE FOR VAR I. ABLE 9: k ESPUNSIbI Li TV TOKENS TL EIW'IRCM-ENT
SniJRCF SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A: SI T PCS—NOT 7 6 2 . 6 1 3 1 76 2 . 6 1 3 5 . 2  13
6 : PERS S IH-MJT 2 5 .  3 1 2 1 2 - •. 5 13 C . 1 7 6
C : ENVL SIM-EST 1 1 2  . 8 1 3 1 1 1 2 • 8 1 C . 7 fi 6
A * B 1 7 . 1 1 3 1 1 7 . 1 1 3 C . 1 1 9
A * C 4 6 . 5 1 3 1 4 6 . 5 1 3 C . 2  2 4
B * C 1 6 5 . 3 1 3 1 1 6 5 . 3 1 3 1 . 1 5 2
A*B*C 4 . 5 1 3 1 4 . 5 1 3 C . C3 1
E RR OR 1 0 3 3 4 . 70C 7 2 14 3 . 5 3  8
JMMAR.Y TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1 0 :  RESPONSIBILITY TOKENS TC CHANCE
SOURCE SUM CF SQUARESf DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T POS-NOT 3 . 6 1 3 1 3 . 6 1 3 C. C7 3
Q:PERS S 10 —NOT 0 . 1 1 3 1 0 . 1 1 3 C .CQ2
C : E N V L SIM- EST 1G 8 . 1 1 3 1 1 0 8 . 1 1 3 2 . 1 9 7
A * B 3 2 . 5 1 3 1 3 2 . 5 1 3 C . 6 6 1
A * C 3 7 . 8 1 3 1 3 7 . 8 1 3 C . 7 6 8
B * C 5 . 5 1 3 1 5 . 5 1 3 C . 112
A*B*C 9 .  1 1 3 1 <3.113 C . 1 8 5
ERROR 3 5 4  3 . ICO 7 2 4 S . 2 1 0
>UM MARY TABLE FCR V A R I ABLE 11: RESPONSIBILITY TOKENS Tu COTTER
SOL) RCG SUM OF SQUARES L> F mean s q u a r e F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 5 6 1 . . 8 0 0 56 1 . 8 0  0 5 . 8 3 5
IV: PERS SIM-NOT 6 8 . 4 5 0 6 8 . 4  3 G C • t / 4
C.:ENVL SIM-EST 3 6 . 4 5 0 1 3 6 . 4 5  0 C • 3 5 9
A * B 1 2 . 8 0 0 i 1 2 . 8 0 0 C . 1 2 6
A * C 3 9 . 2 0 0 l 3 9 . 2 0 0 C . 3 8 6
D * C 3 1 . 2 5 0 i 3 1 . 2  50 C . 2 0 8
A*8*C 2 4 . 2 0 0 i 2 4 . 2 0 0 C . 23  8
ERROR 7 3 0 7 . 3 0 0 72 1 0 1 . 4 9 7
NUMMARY TABLE FCR VAR I ABLE 12:  BLAME TCK ENS TO SARAH
SOURC E SUM GF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A: SIT POS-NOT 7 4 . 1 1 3 1 7 4 . 1 1 3 C • 2 0 3
B: PERS SIM-NOT 3 0 0 . 3 1 3 1 3 0 C . 3 1 3 C . 8  23
C : 6NVL SIM- EST 7 0 . 3 1 3 1 7 C . 3 1 3 C .  15 3
A * B 0 . 6 1 3 1 C .  6 1 3 C . C G2
A * C 3 2 . 5 1 3 1 3 2 . 5 1 3 C .C 89
8 A C 4 0 . 6 1 3 1 4 0 . 6  13 0 . 1 1 1
A*B*C 3 9 1 . 6 1 3 1 39 1 . 6 1 3 1 . C 7 3
ERROR 2 6 2 7 3 . 3 0 0 72 3 6 4 . 9 0 7
SUMMARY TABLE FCR VARIABLE i s : BLAME TOKENS TO CThFR
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 3 4 0 . 3 1 3 . 1 3 4 C . 3 1 3 2 • 3 4  7
fi: PERS S IM—NOT 2 3 2 . 1 1 3 1 33 2 . 1 1 3 2 . 2 9 0
C : E NVL SI M- EST 2 5 . 3 1 3 2 5 . 3 1 3 C . 1 7 5
A * B 2 . 8 1 3 1 2 . 8 1 3 C . C 1 9
A * C 1 4 3 . 1 1 3 1 1 4 3 . 1 1 3 C . 5 8 7
3 * C 2 7 . 6 1 3 1 2 7 . 6 1 3 C . 1 9 0
A -  8 ~ C 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 C . CO7
ERROR 1 0 4 4 1 . 7 0 0 7 2 1 4 5 . 0 2 4
SUMMARY TABLE ECR VARIABLE 1 6 :  RECIDIVISM
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 0 . 4 5 0 1 C . 4 5 0 C . 2 1 5
B: PFRS SIM-NOT 3 . 2 0 0 1 3 . 2 0 0 l.i26
C:ENVL SI M- EST 0 . 0 5 0 1 G. 05C C . C 2 4
A -  B 4 .  0 5 0 1 4 . 0 5 0 1 . S 2 1
A -  C 0 . 2 0 0 1 C . 2 0  0 C . C S 5
Cl -  C 4 .  0 5 0 1 4 . 0 5 C 1 . 9 3 1
A* 3 1 . 8 0 0 1 1 . 3 0 0 C.  £ 5 8
E R R □ R 1 5 1 . 0 0 0 72 2 . C 5 7
SUMMARY TABLE FOR 
SOURCE
VARfAQLE "17:  GIVES ADVICE 
SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : SI T p n s —NOT 0 . 2 0 0  . .... 1 C . 2 0 0 C . 8 8 9  .... _
B: PERS SIM-NGT 0 . 2 0 0 1 0 . 2 0 0 C . 8 8 9
C: ENVL SIM-EST 0 . 0 1 C.G C.O
‘A * B- 0 . 0 5 0 f € . 0 5  0 C . 2 2 2
A * C 0 .  05 0 ... 1 _ C. G5 0  . C . 2 2 2  .
8 # C 0 . 0 5 0 1 C. 0 5 0 C . 2 2 2
A*B*C 0 . 8 0 0 1 C. 8 0 0 3 . 5 5 6
ERROR 1 6 . 2 0 0 72 G . 2 2 5
SUMMARY TABLE FCR VARIABLE 1 8 :  NUMBER OF WORD'S IN ADVICE
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE F
A : SI T POS-NOT 1 2 4 0 . 3 1 3 1 1 2 4 0 . 3 1 3 C . 4 5 9
B: PEPS S IM—NOT 1 1 7 8 . 1 1 3 1 1 1 7 8 . 1 1 3 C . 4 3 6
C:ENVL SIM- EST 7 3 8 . 1 1 3 1 7 3 8 . 1 1 3 C . 2 7 3
A * 8 3 5 7 7 . 8 1 4 1 3 5 7 7 . 8 1 4 1 . 3  2 3
A M C 2 4 1 . 5 1 3  . 1 2 4 1 . 5 1 3 C. C8 9
8 * C 1 8 9 1 . 5 1 3 1 1 8 9 1 . 5 1 3 C . 6 9 9
A*B*C 1C 7 3 . 1 1 3 1 1 0 7 3 . 1 1 3 C . 3 9 7
ERROR 1 9 4 7 5 3 . 9 0 0 ' 72 2 7 0 4 . 9 1 5
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SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE- 1: GOOD
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE
A : S I T  PCS-NOT
8 : PERS SIM-NOT
CsENVL SIM- EST  
A' '* B 
A * C 
8 * C
A ^3 "C
ERROR
0 . 4 5  0 
0.000 
, 0.200 
“ 0 . 0 5 0  
1 . 2 5 0  
0.200 
0 . 0  50  
5 2 . 6 0 0
C . 4 5 0
C.CCO
72
C . 2 0 0
Ci 0 5 0
1 . 2 5 0
C . 2 0 0
C . 0 5 0
0 . 7 3 1
C . 6 1 6
C .COO
C . 2 7 4
C . C 6 8
1 . 7 1 1
C . 2  74
C . C 6 8
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 2:  RATIONAL
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A: SIT POS-NOT 2 ».8 .13 ______________ 1___________ 2 - 8 1 3  2 *4 C 8 _
8 : PERS SIM-NOT 0 . 1 1 3  1 C.  113 C . C S 6
CsENVL SIM- EST 1 . 0 1 2  1 1 . 0 1 3  C . F 6 7
A * B 1 . 0 1 3    1 ------------------  1 . 0 1 3 .......... C . 1 6 7
A * C 1 . 0 1 3  1 1 . 0 1 3  C . F 6 7
3 * C 0 . 3 1 3  1 0 . 3 1 3  C . 2 6 8
A*B*C 2 . 1 1 3  1 2 . 1 1 3  1 . 8 0 9
ERROR 84 . IOC 7 2  -- 1 . 1 6 8      -
" S U M M A R Y  TABLE FOR VARIABLE 3: REPUTABLE
r~
SOURCE SUM GF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE
A : S I T  POS-NOT
B 2 PER S SIM-NOT
C:ENVL SIM- EST  
A * 8
A r c
B * C 
A* 8* C
ERROR
0 . 3 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3  
2. 113 
0 . 3 1 3  
0 . 3 1 3  
0 . 0 1 3  
' 6 0 . 7 0  0
1
1
1
7 2
0 . 6 1 3
C . 3 1 3
€ . 6 1 3
2 .  1 1 3
C . 3 1 3
0 . 3 1 3
0 . 0 1 3
C . 8 4 3
C . 7 2  7
C . 3 7 1
C . 7 2 7
2 . 5 C 6
C . 3 7 1
C . 3 7 1
C. C1 5
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 4 :  STRONG
S OU RC SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE
A : S I T  POS-NOT 
B : PE RS SIM-NOT 
CtENVL SIM- EST  
A * B 
A * C 
B * C 
A*8*C
E RROR
0 . 1 1 3  
5 . 5 1 3  
0 .  1 1 3  
0 . 0  I T  
0.313 
1 . 0 1 3  
0 . 0 1 3  
1 1 9 . 9 0 0
J.
1
1
T
1
1
1
72
0 . 1 1 3
5 . 5 1 3
0 . 1 1 3
0 . 0 1 3
0 . 3 1 3
1 . 0 1 3
C . 0 1 3
1.665
C. C6 8
3.2 10
C. C6 8
C * C 0 8~
C . 1 8 8
C. 6 C8
C «C C 8
SUMMARY TABLE FCR VARIABLE 5: DEEP-----
SOURCF SUM GF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE
A: SI T .POS-NOT. .  
B : PERS SIM-NOT 
C • ENVL S IM-EST 
A - 8 ’
A * C 
B * C 
A * B * C
E RROR
.... I. 513 
2 . 8 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3  
6 . 6  13 
0 . 6 1 3  
0 .  113  
1 . 0 1 3  
1 3 2 . 70G
1
1
1
I
1
72
1 . 5 1 3  
2 . 8 1 3  
C . 6 1 3  
64 6 1 3  
0.6 13 
C . 1 1 3  
1 . 0 1 3  
1 . 8 4  3
C .  82 1 
1 . 5 2 6  
0 . 3 3 2  
2 . 5 8 8  
C .  2 3 2 
C. C6 1  
C . 5 4 9
SUMMARY TABLE FCR VARIABLE ■ 6:  ACTIVE
SOURCF SUM GF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE
A : S I T  POS-NOT 
B: PERS SIM-NOT 
C:ENVL SIM- EST  
A * 8 
A * C 
B * C 
A*B*C
ERROR
0 .  1 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3  
0.013 
0.6 13
3 . 6 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3
6 . 6 1 3  
1 1 6 . 3 0 0
1
1
1
_ r
1
1
1
72
0 . 1 1 3
0 . 6 1 3
0 . 0 1 3
0 . 6 1 3
2 . 6 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3
6 . 6 1 3  
1 . 6 1 5
C . 0 7 0
C . 3  79
C • CC8
0.379“
2 . 2 3 6
C . 3 7 9
4.C94
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 7: CALM
SOURCE SUM GF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE
A : S I T  POS-NOT 
B: PERS SIM-NOT 
C: ENVL SIM- EST
A ' B   ““
A * C 
B * C 
A*B*C
ERROR'
3 . 6 1 3  
L . 0 1 3  
0 . 3 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3 “ 
0 .  113
1 . 0 1 3
1 . 0 1 3  
5 4 . 7 G C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
72
3 . 6 1 3
1 . 0 1 3
0 . 3 1 3
0 . 6 1 3
0 . 1 1 3
1 . 0 1 3
1 . 0 1 3
4 . 1 5 5
1 . 3 3 3
C. EQ6
C . 1 4 8
1 . 3 3 3
1 . 2 3 3
C . 7 6 0
SUMMARY TABLE FCR VARIABLE 8 :  KIND
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE
A : S I T  POS-NOT 
B:PERS SIM-NOT 
C : ENVL SI M- EST  
A * B 
A * C 
B * C 
A*B*C
ERROR
0 . 3 1 3
4 . 5 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3  
0 . 0 1 3 “ 
C . 6 1 3
1 . 5 1 3  
0 . 6 1 3
5 7 . 70G
1
1
1
1
1
1
72
0 . 3 1 3
4 . 5 1 3
C . 6 1 3
0 . 0 1 3
C . 6 1 3
1 . 5 1 3
0 . 6 1 3
0 . 8 0 1
C . 3 9 0
5 .  63 1
C . 7 6 4
C.  C16
C . 7 6 4
1 .fc 8 7
C * 764
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 9: HARO
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 1 . 8 0 0 1 1 . 8 0 0 2 . 5 8 2
B : PERS SIM—NOT 5 . 0 0 0 1 5 . 0 0 0 7 . 1 7 1
CsENVL SIM- EST 0 . 0 5 0 1 G . 0 5 0 C . C 7 2
A * B 0 . 4 5 0 1 ~~~ ~ € . 4 5 0 C . 1 4 5
____  A * C 0 . 8 0 0  . 1_____ C . 8 0 0 1 . 1 4 7
B * C G . 8 0 0 1 € . 8 0 0 1 .  1 4 7
A * B * C 0 . 4 5  0 1 € . 4 5 0 C .  £ 4 5
ERROR 5 0 . 2 0 0 72 € . 6 9  7
------ —---------
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 10:  SUCCESSFUL
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 0 . 8 0 0 _1______ € . 8 0 0 C. * 3 4 ___
B: PERS SIM-NOT 0 .  8 0 0 1 € . 8 0 0 C .  * 3 4
C : ENVL SIM- EST 1 .  8 0 0 1 1 . 8 0 0 1 . 4 2 7
cc.*< ' 0 . 8 0 0  " ... r € . 8 0  0 ' C. 6 3 4 -------
A * C 0 .  8 0 0 1 C.  8 0 0 C • * 3 4
8 * C 1 .  8 0 0 1 1 . 8 0 0 1 . 4 2 7
A*8*C 0 .  2 0 0 I C . 2 0 0 G. 1 5 9
ERROR 9 0 .  80 0 ........ 7 2 ----------- 1 . 2 6 1  “ -------------
SUMMARY TA RLE FOR VARIABLE 11: FULL*
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS- NOT_____ 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 C . 5 6 8
B : PERS SIM-NOT 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 C . 5 6 8
C: ENVL SIM- EST 2 . 8 1 3 1 2 . 8 1 3 1 . 5 7 8
.. A * 8 -p--l I 3  -_ _ _ 1  . 0 . 1 1 3 “..... C . C 6 3
A * C 0 . 6 1 3 __________ 1 ____________________ 0 . 6 1 3 C . 3 4 4
8 * C 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 C . 5 6 8
A*3*C 4 . 5 1 3 1 4 . 5 1 3 2 . 5 3 2
ERROR 1 2 8 . 3 0 0 7 2 -------- !  .  7 82
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1 2 :  HOT . . . . -------------- . . .  . . . .....
SOURCE SUM GF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 1 . 5 1 3 .... 1 ______ 1 . 5 1 3 _____ 2 . 1 6 5 ____
B : PF'RS SIM-NOT 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 . 0 1 3 C .C 18
C : E N V L SIM- EST 0 . 0 1 3 1 C. . 013 C . 0 1 8
A * B 0 . 3 1 3 " 1 "...... " “ C . 3 1 3  ..... C . 4 4 7 -------
A * C 0 . 3 1 3 1 0 . 3 1 3 C . 4 4 7
B * C 4 . 5 1 3 1 4 . 5 1 3 t . 4 5 3
A - 3 - C 0 . 0 1 3 1 0 . 0 1 3 € . 0 1 8
ERROR 5 0 . 3 G 0  — 72 - 0 . 6 9 9 ---------—  - —----------
ARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1 3 :  PLEASANT—
OURCE SUM GF SQUARES OF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 0 . 3 1 3 _ I _________ 0 . 3 1 3 C .  3 0 4
B:PERS SIM-NOT 0 . 1 1 3 1 0 . 1 1 3 C . 1 1 0
C: ENVL SI M- EST 1 . 0 1 3 1 1 . 0 1 3 c *s a 6
A * B 0 . 3 1 3  .. _ — 0 . 3  13 C . 3 0 4
A * C 0 . 6 1 3 1 C . 6 1 3 C . 5 S 7
6 * C 0 . 6 1 3 1 C . 6 1 3 C . 5 S 7
A*B*C 0 . 6 1 3 1 0 . 6 1 3 C.  5S7
ERROR 7 3 . 9 0 0 72 1 . 0 2 6
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1 4 :  UNYIELDING
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE
A : S I T  POS-NOT 0 . 4 5 0 1 C . 4 5 0 C . 2 6 8
B: PERS SIM-NOT 7 . 2 0 0 1 7 . 2 0 0 4 . 2 9 1
C:ENVL SIM- EST 5 . 0 0  0 1 5 . 0 0 0 2 . 5 8 0
A * B 4 . 0 5 0 --- 4 . 0 5 0 2 . 4 1 4
A * C 0 . 0 5 0 1 C . 0 5 0 C .  C30
8 * C - 0 . CO0 1 — G .  0 0 0 -C .COO
A*B*C C. 4 5 0 1 C . 4 5 0 C . 2 6 8
E RROR 1 2 0 . 8 0 0 72 1 . 6 7 8
SUMMARY-TABLE- FOR VARIABLE 15: GENTLE
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
____A : S I T  POS- NOT_____ _ 2 . 8 1 3 __________ ....1 ____ 2 . 8 1 3 ___ __ 3 . 59 7 _____
B:PERS SIM-NOT 2 * 1 1 3 1 2 . 1 1 3 2 . 7 0 2
C:-ENVL SIM- EST 0 .  11 3 1 G.  113 0 .  144
A # 8 0 • 3 13 ....  .... 1 0 . 3 1 3 C . 4 0 0
o<
i 0 . 3 1 3 .....1 ... . 0 . 3 1 3 C. 4 C0
B * C 0 .  6 1 3 1 0 . 6 1 3 C . 7 8 3
A*B*C 0 . 6 1 3 1 0 . 6 1 3 C . 7 8 3
ERROR 5 6 . 3 0 0 7 2  — 0 . 7 8 2
SUMMARY TABLE FCR  VARIABLE 16:  SANE-
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE' F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 0 . 0 5 0 __1_______ 0 . 0 5 0 C .  0 4 4
B : PERS SIM-NOT 1 . 2 5 0 1 1 . 2 5 0 1 . C5 8
CiENVL SIM- EST 0 . 0 5 0 1 0 . 0 5 0 C . 0 4 4
A 0 . 4 5  0" ~............. ... 1 0 . 4 5 0 0 . 3 9 5
A * C 1 . 2 5 0 1 1 . 2 5 0 1 . C S 8
B * C 0 . 4 5 0 1 C . 4 5 0 C . 3 5 5
A*B*C 0 . 0 5 0 1 C. C5 0 C. C 4 4
ERROR 8 2 . 0 0 0 “ 7 2  — 1 . 1 3 9 —------ ----------
SUMMARY TABLE FCR VARIABLE 13: BLAME TOKENS TO ENVIRONMENT.
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARES DF MEAN SQUARE F
A : S I T  POS-NOT 3 0 8 . 1 1 3  ^. _ 3 0 8 . 1 1 3 1 . 3 7 5
B : PERS SIM-NOT 1 . 5 1 3 1 1 . 5 1 3 C . CC7
C : ENVL SIM- EST 1 7 7 . 0 1 3 1 1 7 7 . 0 1 3 C . 7 9 0
'A =Jc b . 9 0 . 3 1 3 1 9 C . 3 1 3 C • A C 3
A * C 5 2 . 8 1 3
- ^ 5 2 . 3 1 3 C . 2 3 6  ...
R • * C 5 3 7 . 0 1 3 1 9 8 7 . 0 1 3 4 . 4 C 6
A*3*C 5 6 . 1 1 3 1 5 6 . 1 1 3 C . 2 5 1
E Rj<0 R 1 6 1 2 8 . 1 0 0 72 2 2 A. 0 0 1
SUMMARY TABLE FOR VARIABLE 1 4 :  8LAME TOKENS TO CHANCE”
SOURCE SUM OF SQUARFS OF MEAN SQUARE F
A: SIT POS-NOT 5 4 . 4 5 0  .1 5 4 • 4 5 0 C . f  3 6
B: PFRS SIM-NOT 4 8 . 0 5 G  1 4 6 . 0 , 5 0 C . 4 7 3
CiFNVL SIM- EST 2 5 6 . 4 5 0  1 2 9 6 . 4 5 0 2 . 5 1 7
A  ^ B 4 . 0 5 C  1 4 . 0 5 0 C . 0 4 0
A C 3 6 . 4 5 0  1 3 6 . 4 5 0 C . 3 5 9
B C 6 . 0 5 0  1 6 . 0 5 0 C . C 6 0
A*B*C 1 7 4 . C50 1 1 7 4 . 0 5 0 1 . 7 1 3
E RROR 7 3 1 7 . 2 0 0  72 1 0 1 . 6 2 8
REFERENCES
Bennett, L. A. Perceived similarity: An influence on the attribution
of mental illness? (Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University,
1972). Dissertation Abstracts International, 1973, 33. 3925 £• 
Brewer, M. B. An information-processing approach to attribution of 
responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
1977, 11, 58-69.
Chaiken, A. L., & Darley, J. M. Victim or perpetrator? Defensive
attribution of responsibility and the need for order and jus- 
tice. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1973» 25.
268-275.
Crocetti, G. M., Spiro, H. R., & Siassi, I. Are the ranks closed? 
‘Attitudinal social distance and mental illness. American 
Journal of Psychiatry, 1971, 127. 1121-1127'.
Farina, A. Some interpersonal consequences of being mentally ill or
mentally retarded. In press, American Journal of Mental Defi­
ciency, 1975.
Farina, A., Allen, J. G., & Saul, B. B. B. The role of the stigmatized 
in affecting social relationships. Journal of Personality,
1968, 36, 169-182.
Farina, A. & Felner, R. D. Employment interviewer reactions to former 
mental patients. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1973, 82, 
268-272.
79
80
Farina, A., Felner, R. D., & Boudreau, L. A. Reactions of workers to
male and female mental patient job applicants. Journal of Con­
sulting and Clinical Psychology, 1973» J±l» 363-372.
Farina, A., Gliha, D., Boudreau, L. A., Allen, J. G., & Sherman, M.
Mental illness and the impact of believing others know about 
it. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1971, 77. 1-5*
Farina, A. & Hagelauer, H. D. Sex and mental illness: The generosity
of females. Unpublished manuscript, University of Connecticut,
197U.
Farina, A. and Hagelauer, H. D. Sex and mental illness: The generos­
ity of females. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology,
1975, 122.
Farina, A., Holland, C. H., & Ring, K. The role of stigma and set in 
interpersonal interaction. Journal of Abnormal Psychology,
1966, 71, 1+21-1+28.
Farina, A. & Ring, K. The influence of perceived mental illness on
interpersonal relations. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1965,
20, 1+7-51.
Farina, A., Thaw, J., Lovem, J. 3)., & Mangone, P. People's reaction 
to a fonner mental patient moving to their neighborhood.
Journal of Community Psychology, 191ki Zj 108-112.
Fishbein, M. & Ajzen, I. Attribution of responsibility: A theoretical
note. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1973, 2j> l W “
153.
Goffman, E. Stigma. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.
Heider, F. The psychology of interpersonal relations. Hew York: Wiley,
1958.
81
Jones, E. E. & Davis, K. E. Prom acts to dispositions. In L. Berko- 
witz (Ed.) Advances in experimental social psychology. Vol. 2. 
New York: Academic Press, 1965, PP. 219-266.
Jones, E. E., Rock, L., Shaver, K. G., Goethals, G. R., & Ward, L. M.
Pattern of performance and ability attribution: An unexpected
primacy effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
1968, 10, 317-31+0.
Jones, E. E., Kanouse, D. E., Kelley, H. K., Nisbett, R. E., Valins,
S., & Weiner, B. (Eds.). Attribution: Perceiving the causes
of behavior. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1972*
Kelley, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology. In D. Levine 
(Ed.) Nebraska symposium on motivation. Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1967, PP* 192-238.
Kelley, H. E. Attribution in social interaction. New York: General
Learning Press, 1971*
Kelley, H. H. The processes of causal attribution. American Psycholo­
gist, 1973, 28, 107-128.
Lerner, M. J. Evaluation of performance as a function of performer's 
reward and attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 1965, 2, 35S-360.
Lerner, M. J. & Agar, E. The consequences of perceived similarity:
Attraction and rejection, approach and avoidance. Journal of 
Experimental Research in Personality, 1972, 69-75*
Lerner, M. J. & Becker, S. W. Interpersonal choice as a function of 
ascribed similarity and definition of the situation. Human 
Relations, 1962, i£, 2U-3U.
82
Lerner, M. J. & Matthews, G. Reactions to suffering of others under
conditions of indirect responsibility. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 19&7> 319-325*
Lerner, M. J. & Simmons, C. W. Observer’s reactions to the "innocent 
victim": Compassion or rejection? Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 1966, i£, 203-210.
McKillip, J. Similarity and the attribution of responsibility. Paper 
presented at the meeting of the Midwestern Psychological Asso­
ciation, Cleveland, May 1972.
McKillip, J. & Posavac, E. J. Attribution of responsibility for an
accident: Effects of similarity to the victim and severity of
consequences. Proceedings of the 80th Annual Convention of 
the American Psychological Association, 1972> £, 181-182. 
Miller, 3). T. & Ross, M. Self-serving biases in the attribution of
causality: Fact or fiction? Psychological Bulletin, 1975* 82,
213-225*
Nisbett, R. E. & Valins, S. Perceiving the causes of one * s own behav­
ior. Morristown, N. J.: General Learning Press, 1971*
Novak, 3). & Lerner, M. J. Rejection as a consequence of perceived 
similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
1968, 2, 1U7-152.
Oksner, P. W. The effect of institutional history and physical attrac­
tiveness on the assignment of social distance to a stranger. 
Unpublished manuscript, College of William and Mary, 1975* 
Phillips, 3). L. Help sources and rejection of the mentally ill. 3>oc- 
toral dissertation, Yale University, 1962.
83
Phillips, D. L. Rejection of the mentally ills The influence of
behavior and sex. American Sociological Review, 1961*, 29» 679- 
687.
Rabkin, J. Public attitudes toward mental illness: A review of the
literature. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 197U> 10* 7-33•
Ring, K. & Farina, A. Personal adjustment as a determinant of aggres­
sive behavior toward the mentally ill. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 1969> 33* 683-690.
Rosenhan, D. On being sane in an insane place. Science, 1973> 179,
250-2S7.
Rotter, J. B. Generalized expectancies for internal versus external 
control of reinforcement. Psychological Monographs, 1966, 80_
(1, Whole No. 609).
Scheff, T. J. Being mentally ill; A sociological theory,. Chicago: 
Aldine, 1966.
Schroeder, D. A. & Linder, D. E. Effects of actor's causal role, out­
come severity, and knowledge of prior accidents upon attribu­
tions of responsibility. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 1976, 12, 3U0-3S6.
Shaver, K. G. Redress and conscientiousness in the attribution of
responsibility for accidents. Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology, 1970, 6_, 100-110. (a)
Shaver, K. G. Defensive attribution: Effects of severity and relevance
on the responsibility assigned for an accident. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, llu 101-113. (b)
84
Shaver, K. G. Defensive attribution: Effects of situational possibil­
ity and personal similarity on the assignment of responsibility 
(mimeo). Reported in K. G. Shaver, Defensive attribution of 
responsibility, Washington: National institute of Mental
Health, 1971 (mimeo).
Shaver, K. G. Intentional ambiguity in the attribution of responsibil­
ity: A reply to Fishbein and Ajzen. Unpublished manuscript,
College of William and Mary, 1973•
Shaver, K. G. An introduction to attribution processes. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Winthrop, 197!?*
Shaw, M. E. & Sulzer, J. L. An empirical test of Heider's levels in
attribution of responsibility. Journal of Abnormal and Social 
Psychology, 196^, 62., 39-1+6.
Sorrentino, R. M. & Boutilier, R. G. Evaluation of a victim as a func­
tion of fate similarity/dissimilarity. Journal of Experimental 
Social Psychology, 1974* 10* 81+—93 •
Storms, M. D. & Nisbett, R. E. Insomnia and the attribution process.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1970, 16, 319-328. 
Sulzer, J. L. & Burglass, R. K. Responsibility attribution, empathy, 
and punitiveness. Journal of Personality, 1968, 36, 272-282. 
Vidmar, N. & Crinklaw, L. D. Attributing responsibility for an acci­
dent: A methodological and conceptual critique. Canadian
Journal of Behavioral Science, 197l+> 6.> 112-130.
Walster, E. Assignment of responsibility for an accident. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology. 1966, 73-79*
Weiner, B. Achievement motivation and attribution theory. Morristown,
N. J.: General Learning Press, 1974*
85
Wright, B. Physical disability-A psychological approach. New York: 
Harper & Row, I960.
Yablonsky, L. Watch out, whitey. The New Republic, 1966, 154, 10-12. 
Younger, J. C., Arrowood, A. J., & Harris, V. A. Is love blind?
Defensive attribution and the perception of transgression. 
Journal of Personality, in press.
Zimmerman, J. S. A social psychological investigation of the mental
illness label. (Doctoral dissertation, University of Georgia,
1973). Dissertation Abstracts International, 1974, J34, 5215 B.
VITA
Phyllis White Oksner
The author was born in Harrisonburg, Virginia, on August 12, 1951. 
She graduated from Broadway High School, Broadway, Virginia in June 1969. 
She received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the College of William and 
Mary in June 1973. She was employed by the Tidewater Association for 
Retarded Citizens in the position of Volunteer Coordinator from March 
1974 to August 1974. From August 1974 to July 1975 whe served as Field 
Coordinator for a Social and Rehabilitation Services Grant for the South­
eastern Virginia Training Center for the Mentally Retarded. She is 
presently a candidate for the Master of Arts degree in Psychology at the 
College of William and Mary.
